### 1nc intellectual property sanctions cp

#### Counterplan: The United States Federal Government should implement economic sanctions that will impose costs on Chinese actors that steal US Intellectual Property.

#### Chinese cyber-theft inevitable- harder sanctions needed

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Last month, President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China announced that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” When the agreement was announced, The Heritage Foundation was incredibly skeptical. “The reality is that the president has just made another paper agreement that will do little to change the behavior of bad actors.” The agreement allows the Administration to pat themselves on the back but fails to address the situation. It is safe to say that the deal just isn’t working out. CrowdStrike, a private cybersecurity provider, has issued a public report with evidence that they caught China-affiliated actors red-handed. The Chinese hackers have been hacking, or attempting to hack, U.S. companies, including networks of tech and pharmaceuticals, starting the day after President Xi left Washington, DC. Since China has yet to acknowledge that they ever engaged in cybercrime, it’s really no wonder they broke this meaningless agreement. The elephant in the room is China’s alternative view toward warfare and cyberspace. The Chinese have a dramatically different view of cyberspace and warfare. For them, their cyber operations, ranging from the economic to the more traditional government espionage, are just parts of their larger warfare strategy during peacetime. On a domestic level, the U.S. believes the Internet is a tool that enriches commerce and freedom, while the Chinese government fears the Internet for the same reasons. With such profound differences between the U.S. and China, it was clear the Chinese never intended to uphold their end of the bargain. The U.S. should respond aggressively to this clear violation of the agreement to show that it does not tolerate the actions of cyber espionage. There are four ways to do this: 1. Cease cooperation. No longer participate in cyber war games, dialogues, or working groups with the Chinese; 2. Constrain travel. Limit visas to the U.S. for individuals and organizations suspected of cyber-espionage; 3. Create economic repercussions. Implement economic sanctions that will impose costs on bad actors; and 4. Challenge Internet control: Weaken Chinese Internet control mechanisms. This would raise the cost of domestic control through the promotion of democratic movements. The agreement made by the Obama Administration was based on the false assumption that China was a trustworthy partner in combatting cybercrime. Instead of securing cyberspace, however, this agreement surrendered the moral high ground to China. Rather than just saying, “I told you so,” Congress now needs to clean up this failed policy and work to actually change China’s behavior.

### 1nc Singapore CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should ask Singapore to propose (plan text) to China.

#### Observation One: The counterplan is legitimate. It test the engagement which is the core question of the topic

#### Observation Two: Net benefits

#### The counterplan solves the case and avoids Disads to direct engagement – Singapore is well positioned to serve as an intermediary and will say yes

Emma Chanlett-Avery 13, Specialist in Asian Affairs, “Singapore: Background and U.S. Relations”, 7/26/13, Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20490.pdf

Singapore has been a strong champion of ASEAN, which helps Southeast Asia’s mostly small countries to influence regional diplomacy, particularly vis-à-vis China. Renewed U.S. engagement under the Obama Administration has pleased Singapore and may have allowed it more diplomatic space to stand up to Beijing on key issues. Singapore has praised the Administration’s “rebalancing” effort toward Asia, yet has been careful to warn that anti-China rhetoric or efforts to “contain” China’s rise will be counterproductive. During an April 2013 visit to Washington, Prime Minister Lee advised the United States to strengthen its economic ties to the region and develop more trust with Beijing. Maintaining strong relations with both China and the United States is a keystone of Singapore’s foreign policy. Singapore often portrays itself as a useful balancer and intermediary between major powers in the region. In the South China Sea dispute, for example, in 2011 Singapore—a non-claimant—called on China to clarify its island claims, characterizing its stance on the issue as neutral, yet concerned because of the threat to maritime stability. At the same time, Singapore was hosting a port visit by a Chinese surveillance vessel, part of an ongoing exchange on technical cooperation on maritime safety with Beijing. China’s economic power makes it a crucial component of trade policy for all countries in the region, but Singapore’s ties with Beijing are multifaceted and extend to cultural, political, and educational exchanges as well. There are frequent high-level visits between Singapore and China. Singapore adheres to a one-China policy, but has an extensive relationship with Taiwan and has managed it carefully to avoid jeopardizing its strong relations with Beijing. Taiwan and Singapore have held large-scale military exercises annually for over 30 years and, in 2010, announced the launch of talks related to a free-trade pact under the framework of the World Trade Organization.

### 1nc Shamefare and Deterrence CP

#### The United States federal government should implement a “shamefare” and deterrence strategy aimed at deterring aggression in the South China Sea by the People’s Republic of China. Such a strategy should include but not be limited to

--coordination and planning with regional allies

--active documentation of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea

--comprehensive distribution of such materials on social media

--a public statement underscoring the importance of preserving the regional status quo in the South China Sea

-revitalized Air-Sea Battle concept

continued FONOP operations

complete documentation of Beijing’s destruction of the environment around island reclamation projects

encouraging increased “lawfare” with Vietnam and other South China Sea claimants suing China in international courts

making Asia its single most important foreign policy focus.

#### Implementing a “shamefare” strategy in response to Chinese actions in the SCS solves – raises the diplomatic costs of their aggression

Kazianis 6/2/16 (Harry, fellow for National Security affairs at the Potomac Foundation and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest. He is the former Executive Editor of the National Interest and former Editor-In-Chief of The Diplomat, "For the US, Sailing Around the South China Sea Is Not Strategy," http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-sailing-around-the-south-china-sea-not-strategy-16429)

The rise of China – and its campaign to “salami slice [4]” its way – occupying small pieces of reefs and semi-submerged features in the South China Sea in increments towards regional dominance – threatens America’s dominant position in Asia. Beijing’s seemingly inexhaustible need to control the world’s most economically vibrant region has set in motion what the New York Timesrightly called a “game of chicken [5]” that many fear could spark a tragic great-power war. China’s goal is simple: Dominate the Asia-Pacific and slowly but surely push America out. To achieve this, Beijing must negate the sizeable military assets Washington has in the region – especially the US Navy. To operationalize such a strategy, Beijing has developed a concept known to Western strategic analysts as anti-access/area-denial, or A2/AD. Leveraging the combined strength of such military platforms as ultra-quiet submarines; more than 80,000 sea mines, the world’s largest inventory; air-defense platforms; budding undersea tracking systems [6]; various cruise missiles; and two deadly anti-ship ballistic missile systems, China has set the stage to turn areas around its near seas, as far away as the very ends of the South China Sea towards Indonesia, into what some are calling a “no-man's land” for US naval vessels and aircraft. And Beijing’s A2/AD strategy launched in early-2000s seems now to be expanding into what author Robert Kaplan called Asia’s Cauldron [7], or the South China Sea. China has undertaken what can only be described as a clever effort to build small military outposts on reclaimed reefs, underwater features and islands. While at various times claiming it would not “militarize” the area, Beijing has placed advanced anti-ship weapons, anti-air assets and rotated fighter jets into the area thanks to massive new airfields. If China proceeds by installing anti-ship ballistic missiles along with newly purchased Russian S-400 air-defense batteries [8], the stage would be set for not only a credible South China Sea air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) but the severe degradation of America’s military capabilities in this economically critical body of water. In the event of a crisis, Washington would face a terrible choice: unthinkable military losses or simply walking away, thus leaving the region to China’s mercy and America and its critical alliance networks marginalized or even broken. As for responding to the changing strategic situation in Asia, the United States has suffered a series of setbacks, some unavoidable and others self-inflicted. When Washington could turn its attention to Asia – complicated by Russian actions in Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic State – the results have been mixed. While the Pentagon has attempted to dampen the impact of China’s A2/AD strategy with an important operational concept named Air-Sea Battle (ASB) – designed to leverage the combined joint warfare operational powers of the US Navy and Air Force to take down Beijing’s anti-access networks – fears of possible escalatory strikes on the Chinese mainland that could lead to a nuclear showdown have stirred controversy and unneeded doubt. Also, by its very nature focusing on armed conflict, ASB does nothing to place needed roadblocks to stop China from expanding its potential zone through reclaimed reefs and military equipment in the South China Sea. So far, the only US action that demonstrates resolve has been to conduct three so-called “freedom of navigation” operations, or FONOP – suggesting to Beijing that Washington will [9] “fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows.” Unfortunately for the United States, while such actions show some sort of response, they do nothing to slow China’s attack on the status-quo – and fall far short of a much needed comprehensive strategy. As Washington simply sails around the South China Sea, Beijing presses ahead with installing ever-more advanced pieces of military hardware and could be planning to reclaim the strategically important Scarborough Shoal next. Beijing’s new islands and equipment are permanent; while America’s naval excursions are temporary, the vessels destined to float away. Considering the stakes in the South China Sea for the United States along with regional allies like Japan, the Philippines and others, a stronger set of options is needed to dramatically slow or halt Beijing’s attempts to unwind the status quo. Sizeable roadblocks must be placed before China that, if crossed, would entail a sizeable price from Beijing. I have proposed in the past a concept called “shamefare [10]” as a challenge to Chinese actions in the South China Sea by publicly embarrassing China for its expansionist moves. The United States, along with its regional partners and allies, must make every effort at documenting Beijing’s actions and distributing them around the world – especially through social media. For example, video cameras should be placed on any military asset that has the potential to come in contact with the Chinese military or paramilitary actors. If an aggressive action is taken by China – as when a Chinese J-11 fighter came within 15 meters of a US surveillance plane on May 17 – the US government should release the recording without delay. Reports have noted the Pentagon has footage of the incident, but won’t release it – an error that must be corrected. Additionally, the recent US FONOP in the South China Sea near Fiery Cross Reef should also have been documented – putting a human and important non-threatening face on such operations. Shamefare should also be expanded to allies and partners like the Philippines and Vietnam who have had negative interactions with China on the high seas. Imagine if Manila had documented the 2012 standoff with Beijing over Scarborough Shoal for the whole world to see? What if Hanoi had filmed in greater detail China’s billion-dollar oil rig off its coast surrounded by more than 100 fishing and other vessels? Imagine if such images and video were shared on popular social media networks then filtering down to television and standard news organizations – the impact and outcry would be truly historic while dramatically increasing the costs of such aggressive Chinese actions. Shamefare itself though is not a strategy. It must be combined with a revitalized Air-Sea Battle concept, now called JAM-GC; continued FONOP operations; complete documentation of Beijing’s destruction of the environment around island reclamation projects; increased “lawfare” with Vietnam and other South China Sea claimants suing China in international courts; and Washington once and for all making Asia its single most important foreign policy focus. Anything short of such an effort will see China dominate the region. Considering the dilemma presented by Beijing, Washington has been caught off guard by the scope, size and sophistication of China’s coercion. A do “something foreign policy” full of slogans and slick-sounding military concepts alone is a recipe for disaster. Only a focused America, willing to enact a bold strategy in the face of Beijing’s aggressive actions has a chance of success. Indeed, one thing is plainly obvious – simply sailing around the South China Sea is not a strategy for success.

### 1NC 6 Party Talks CP

#### The United States federal government should

* propose a low-level diplomatic meeting to North Korea
* as a precondition to a high-level diplomatic meeting, have North Korea agree to
  + suspend nuclear and long-range missile tests
  + allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor its nuclear sites
* upon North Korea’s declaration of a moratorium on all nuclear activities and missile tests, declare readiness to negotiate the denuclearization process at the Six Party Talks
* upon the initiation of complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs, discuss diplomatic normalization with the DPRK
* upon the completion of the CVID process, reconvene the Six-Party talks to complete a peace treaty between China, the United States, and the two Koreas

Choi 16 [Jon Kung Choi, Associate Professor of Political Science & International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, and policy advisory board for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and ROK Air Force; “The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea”; pp 67-68; The Elliott School of International Affairs; The Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 4; Winter 2016; accessed 06/29/2016; <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Winter2016\_Choi.pdf>.]

One option may essentially be to test if North Korea is willing to receive U.S. security assurances in exchange for denuclearization. A principal risk is that North Korea might cheat and want or try to become a nuclear power anyway. Thus, the most urgent action item for the Obama administration is to find out if North Korea is open to reasonable offers for denuclearization in a verifiable and non-reversible way. The Obama administration needs to specify what steps North Korea should take, how the United States and the members of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) will reciprocate if North Korea cooperates, and what kind of endgame the United States and its allies envision for the future of North Korea. To be clear, inducing the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program should remain the final goal. But it cannot serve as the primary goal for now. For the moment, the primary goal is to make the North realize that negotiation is the only way out of its isolation. Thus, the key element of the general policy toward Pyongyang should be to stop threatening the North with collapsist rhetoric and instead lay out a denuclearization roadmap. The U.S. venture in North Korean denuclearization must start with identifying how serious Pyongyang is in coming back to the 6PT. Diplomacy is a valid approach because it can help us identify if North Korean public statements about the 6PT, which often called for resumption of the multilateral negotiation process, reflect their will to return to the negotiating table. The Obama administration should first propose a low-level meeting to North Korea in order to ascertain this will. As a precondition for a high-level meeting, it can reinforce the February 2012 deal wherein North Korea agreed to suspend nuclear and long-range missile tests and allow inspectors to monitor its nuclear sites in exchange for food aid.45 By resurrecting this deal, the United States can secure a platform to make practical progress in denuclearizing the North while opening the door for further negotiation. Such a series of preparatory meetings between the United States and North Korea can let us determine if Pyongyang’s requirements for security assurance from the United States is nothing more than habitual rhetoric. If and when North Korea confirms its commitment to the denuclearization process by declaring a moratorium on all of its nuclear activities and missile tests, the Obama administration could declare that it is not only ready to negotiate the denuclearization process at the 6PT but also willing to discuss diplomatic normalization with the North to further test Pyongyang’s sincere commitment to peaceful denucleartization. To be clear, the United States should propose initiating diplomatic normalization talks with Pyongyang only if the North initiates the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programs. To secure CVID, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be permitted to enact its nuclear disablement process at the fuel fabrication plant in Yongbyon. This would prevent North Korea from reloading its reactor to generate more plutonium-laden spent fuel. By the time the CVID process has finished, diplomatic normalization between the two states could be complete with a non-aggression pact and peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula. The United States should of course make sure that, should there be any defection or cheating by the North, the whole negotiation process for diplomatic normalization could be reversed. The endgame of the Six-Party Talks should be to secure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and to conclude a peace treaty between China, the United States, and the two Koreas.

#### Preparing for North Korea’s collapse encourages non-engagement – that puts the world at danger as its nuclear capabilities increase

Choi 16 [Jon Kung Choi, Associate Professor of Political Science & International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, and policy advisory board for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and ROK Air Force; “The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea”; pp 58-59; The Elliott School of International Affairs; The Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 4; Winter 2016; accessed 06/29/2016; <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ\_Winter2016\_Choi.pdf>.]

This article outlines the problems of relying on the idea of North Korean “collapsism”—the predictive discourse confidently weighted toward North Korea’s demise, and policies of non-engagement seeking to hasten its collapse. I argue that North Korean collapsism has adversely affected the diplomatic and strategic calculations of the United States, which opposes negotiating with North Korea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, by now we should recognize that North Korea has continued successfully, despite repeated claims of imminent collapse. Even if the current leadership in Pyongyang disappears, why should we expect a new leadership to give up the nuclear weapon programs? Basing policy on such a fantastic hope is foolish. If we agree that the United States and its allies are more rational, strategic, and civilized than North Korea, then re-initiating the peaceful denuclearization process has to come from our side. If we further agree that the likelihood of North Korea’s imminent collapse is low while North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are increasing, can we continue to say that time is on our side? Whoever sits in the Oval Office has to deal with the conundrum of the North Korean nuclear venture sooner or later. The North Korean quagmire will endure whether we imagine its collapse or not, so waiting and preparing for North Korea’s collapse is a terrible idea. The United States and South Korea should create diplomatic opportunities to deal with North Korea on the more likely basis that the regime may well be here to stay and will further expand its nuclear weapons program. Against this backdrop, this article will review the underlying logic behind North Korean collapsism, and argue how and why such an assessment is inimical to achieving the denuclearization of Pyongyang. I will then argue why the policy of strategic patience, namely waiting and preparing for North Korea’s collapse, is a terrible idea for the denuclearization of North Korea, and why engaging North Korea through negotiation sooner rather than later is a rational policy for the U.S. administration to pursue. I will propose a roadmap to induce the North back to the negotiating table, and discuss how the United States and other members of the Six-Party Talks can create the conditions necessary to resume the denuclearization process.

#### North Korean nuclear activity is increasing and becoming more difficult to control – and current methods of non-engagement and containment pressure Kim into aggressive lashout

NYT 5/2 [The Editorial Board of the New York Times; “North Korea’s Brazen Nuclear Moves”; New York Times; 05/02/2016; accessed 07/01/2016; <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/opinion/north-koreas-brazen-nuclear-moves.html?\_r=0>.]

North Korea is still defying the international community with its nuclear weapons program, and it now may have enough fissile material for 20 bombs. Its nuclear-related activity has surged this year, part of an effort by its leader, Kim Jong-un, to enhance his influence ahead of a rare congress of his ruling Workers’ Party. The congress is set to open on May 6. In January, the North carried out its fourth nuclear test, and the following month it conducted a test of a long-range ballistic missile, the kind that could one day carry a nuclear weapon to hit the United States. It claimed to have tested a more powerful rocket engine and to have succeeded at shrinking the size of a nuclear weapon so it can fit on a missile. In April, North Korea fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile and also made three attempts at launching a powerful intermediate-range mobile missile called the Musudan. Though the four most recent tests failed in one way or another, North Korea’s overall activity this year has raised regional tensions and highlighted the inability of the major powers, specifically the United States and China, to curb the North’s dangerous ambitions. Even the United Nations Security Council’s decision in March to impose tougher sanctions on North Korea — a decision in which China, North Korea’s chief ally, concurred — seems to be having little impact. Doubts persist about China’s commitment to enforcing them. The launch failures are an embarrassment for Mr. Kim and have led to speculation that he might attempt another nuclear test — North Korea’s fifth since 2006 — before the party congress, where he hopes to tighten his grip on power. That would inevitably lead to more sanctions and accelerate talks between the United States and South Korea on stationing missile defenses in South Korea. While sanctions are important and China, more than any other country, has the power to make North Korea feel their effects, sanctions alone are not enough to mitigate the threat. Backing an inexperienced and reckless leader like Mr. Kim into a corner is risky and might lead to even more dangerous responses, like aiming a weapon at South Korea or Japan, with potentially catastrophic results. At some point, the United States, along with China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, will have to find a way to revive negotiations aimed at curbing North Korea’s nuclear program. The Obama administration earlier this year had secret contacts with the North that foundered over a disagreement on whether to focus on denuclearization (America’s priority) or on replacing the current Korean War armistice with a formal peace treaty (North Korea’s priority). But the idea of talking with the North is politically unpopular in America, and this is an election year. An opportunity to get the dialogue going again may present itself after the party congress. Robert Carlin, a retired C.I.A. and State Department analyst of North Korea, writes in the 38 North blog of seeing signs that Mr. Kim could by then feel confident enough in North Korea’s nuclear deterrent to shift attention to reforming the economy while pushing again for a new peace proposal. If something like that happens, the administration should be nimble and creative enough to work with such a proposal, despite the obvious difficulties of dealing with Mr. Kim. So far, though, President Obama has shown little interest in applying the approach that he pursued successfully with Iran — a combination of sanctions and negotiations — to North Korea.

### 1nc Canada CP

#### Canada should engage with China over nuclear security standards by implementing the following reforms

* Develop a Canadian nuclear energy agenda
* Promote the global climate agenda
* Strengthen the implementation of nuclear security standards
* Advocate for expansion of the voluntary offer list
* Provide government support for nuclear exports
* Support nuclear research and development programs
* Improve domestic transportation infrastructure
* Support company to company relationships
* Further collaboration on nuclear security standards
* Conduct maritime engagement with China in the South China Sea including military exercises and multilateral talks over disputed territorial boundaries.

#### Solves the entirety of the nuclear power advantage and the prolif scenario.

APF Canada ‘16 – Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, a not-for-profit organization focused on Canada's relations with Asia, funded primarily by the Canadian government (May, “Maximizing Canada’s Nuclear Energy Opportunity in Asia,” https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/filefield/nuclear-report-eng.pdf)//DWB

Canada has more than 70 years of experience in the development and implementation of nuclear∂ energy technology and services. Participants at APF Canada’s December 2 workshop as well as∂ interviewees suggest that Canadian governments and industry should consider the following recommendations∂ in order to overcome barriers to Canada-Asia engagement on nuclear energy, maximize∂ existing synergies and further nuclear safety.∂ 1. Develop a Canadian nuclear energy agenda: Canadian federal and provincial governments∂ need to define what they want to achieve domestically and internationally through engagement∂ with Asian countries on nuclear energy, not simply respond to the needs of Asian countries. Canada∂ should embed its approach to engagement within the broader context of its climate agenda, and∂ economic and geopolitical interests.∂ 2. Use nuclear energy expertise to further the global climate agenda: Canadian federal and∂ provincial governments, the nuclear energy industry and the research community should contribute∂ know-how on nuclear energy technology and regulation to help countries in Asia meet their∂ climate reduction targets safety and effectively.∂ 3. Evolve the Canada-India Joint Committee on Nuclear Cooperation: The existing Joint∂ Committee, which is guiding Canada-India nuclear energy engagement, will need to continue∂ emphasizing commercial and research collaboration, not only non-proliferation issues. The∂ Government of Canada should consider formulating annual work plans and/or establishing an advisory∂ group that can provide insight on priority areas for discussion and action. A potential model∂ for an advisory group could be the U.S.-India “contact group.”∂ 4. Strengthen the implementation of global nuclear safety standards: The Government of∂ Canada should recommend that the IAEA assume an explicit role in monitoring adherence by members∂ to peer reviews and a set of safety standards. Canada should work with like-minded states to∂ explore how the oversight regime can be strengthened. This could involve publically disclosing the∂ names of member states that do not submit their nuclear programs to IAEA peer review. 5. Advocate for expansion of voluntary offer list: Canada should continue to advocate that China∂ add more fuel fabrication and other nuclear related facilities to the IAEA’s voluntary offer list,∂ thereby opening these facilities to inspection. Canada is only permitted to provide uranium, technology∂ and services to facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Extending IAEA access in China∂ would both benefit nuclear safety and security as well as further the sale of Canada’s nuclear energy∂ related products and expertise.∂ 6. Seek clarity on India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act: The Government of Canada∂ needs to continue advocating for a solution to the nuclear liability law issue in order to permit∂ access for Canadian companies.∂ 7. Provide visible government support for nuclear energy exports: Due to the connection∂ between nuclear energy technology and national security, federal and provincial government∂ involvement is essential to opening doors in Asia for Canadian nuclear energy technology companies.∂ The Government of Canada and provincial governments will need to continue to endorse∂ Canada’s nuclear industry abroad and provide ministerial level support for trade missions where∂ possible.∂ 8. Enhance export readiness of small and medium enterprises: Many companies in the nuclear∂ supply chain are small- to medium-sized enterprises that often do not have the financial and∂ human resources to explore Asian markets. The Government of Canada, provincial governments∂ and industry associations need to continue providing services and assistance to help SMEs export∂ technology and services. 9. Ensure a strong nuclear energy R&D industry: Canada has more than 70 years of strong R&D∂ experience in the area of nuclear energy. The Government of Canada and provincial governments∂ need to continue providing nuclear energy R&D/S&T funding to university research centres, labs∂ and industry to ensure the future health of the sector.∂ 10.Improve domestic transportation infrastructure: Canada needs to continue to enhance rail,∂ road and port infrastructure and accessibility to facilitate export of Canadian uranium and other∂ products to Asia.∂ 11. Ensure financing for the export of nuclear energy technology and services: The∂ Government of Canada needs to ensure that its agencies are offering sufficient export credit to∂ support export of nuclear energy technology, within guidelines set by the OECD. In the future,∂ financing third-market Canada-India or Canada-China nuclear energy projects could be explored by∂ selected sectors such as Canadian pension funds and insurance companies.∂ 12. Nurture company-to-company relationships: Canadian nuclear energy technology companies∂ should not rely on government to promote them in Asia. While government sets the framework,∂ Indian and Chinese companies decide who they will partner with on contracts. Canadian companies∂ should seek to establish joint ventures with Indian and Chinese companies, as these are the∂ best way to gain market share.∂ 13. Deepen collaboration on nuclear safety: As India and China increase their use of nuclear∂ energy, government and industry in Canada should continue to collaborate with these countries∂ to enhance nuclear safety both at home and abroad. Canada should negotiate MOUs on technical∂ cooperation and exchange of regulatory information with countries in Asia that are developing (or∂ are considering developing) nuclear energy, including Malaysia and Vietnam.∂ 14.Consult with the Canadian public: The Canadian government and the nuclear energy industry∂ should consult with the public about Canada’s potential role in the nuclear energy industry in Asia.∂ Canada’s nuclear energy industry shares many synergies with the energy needs of Northeast and South∂ Asia. Canada needs to carefully consider its approach to the nuclear energy file. However, strong competition∂ from Asia and other leaders in nuclear energy technology and services means that Canada∂ cannot expect opportunities to wait indefinitely. Canada must choose an approach and then quickly∂ and consistently implement it.

#### Canada naval engagement in the South China Sea deescalates conflict.

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Maritime diplomacy deliberately goes beyond Canada’s∂ Track-Two legacy; East Asian states have mastered the∂ “habits of dialogue” (Dewitt, 1994). In an era of growing∂ naval spending and numerous maritime flashpoints, the region is in need of inclusive security cooperation∂ that builds transparency between navies and coast∂ guards. Canada is already deepening military ties with∂ the region, through, for example, its discussions with∂ Japan towards an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing∂ Agreement, and is negotiating access to military∂ facilities in Singapore. These will support Canada’s∂ proven record of humanitarian assistance and disaster∂ relief (HADR) within the region, evidenced in Sri Lanka∂ in 2004, and offered to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis∂ in 2008. The proposals outlined below are deliberately∂ ambitious and are designed to spark debate about∂ their suitability and feasibility in the context of strained∂ budgets.∂ Given Canada’s previous track record as a trusted∂ bridge builder between China and other states, naval∂ engagement could be one component of maritime∂ diplomacy (Adams, 2012). China’s efforts at defence∂ diplomacy have increased in the past decade, creating∂ opportunities for more frequent and in-depth SinoCanadian∂ defence exchanges. Both countries participate∂ in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and Council∂ for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Given that∂ direct military exercises between the United States∂ and China are banned by US law, there may be an∂ opportunity for Canada to conduct its own bilateral∂ exercises with China; Australia has already done so. In∂ September 2010, the Royal Australian Navy conducted∂ an exercise with the PLA Navy in the Yellow Sea,∂ which included live fire drills, search and rescue (SAR)∂ operations and joint helicopter missions. The Australian∂ Defence Force has also conducted a HADR exercise∂ with the PLA. More ambitiously, Canada and Australia∂ could work together to foster regular naval interaction∂ with China, and bring in new partners over time. This∂ effort would build on the steady stream of Canadian∂ naval port visits to the region since 1995, and build ties in advance of China’s participation in the 2014 Rim of the∂ Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. The ideal geographic focus∂ of this engagement would be the western Pacific Ocean,∂ but a more economical alternative is the Indian Ocean∂ where many of these potential partners are engaged in∂ anti-piracy missions. If deeper naval links are too politically sensitive, coast∂ guard cooperation is an alternative avenue that is∂ valued in East Asia. For instance, despite their often∂ acrimonious relationship, Chinese and Japanese coast∂ guards have conducted three SAR exercises together∂ in an effort to build confidence (Shen and Chen, 2011).∂ Canada, China, Japan and South Korea are members∂ of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF),∂ which coordinates efforts among members to address∂ maritime security challenges. Canada could reach out∂ to other nations, such as South Korea and Japan, who∂ are interested in conducting joint exercises, exchanges∂ or tabletop exercises with Chinese coast guards.∂ Canada already has close working relations with both∂ the South Korean and Japanese coast guards through∂ its membership in the North Pacific Anadromous∂ Fish Commission, which promotes conservation of∂ anadromous fish stocks in the North Pacific. Like∂ Canada, East Asian states confront the challenge of policing a large exclusive economic zone with limited∂ resources, thus Canadian expertise and lessons learned∂ are likely to be appreciated.∂ Canada could also contribute to coast guard capacity∂ building in Southeast Asia. Japan trains a number∂ of Philippine and Indonesian officers at its Coast∂ Guard Academy. Canada could partner with ASEAN∂ states to assist these capacity-building efforts, which∂ could involve Canadian vessels in theatre or simply∂ educational exchanges. Canada could also explore∂ regional interest in the establishment of a Southeast∂ Asian equivalent of the NPCGF. The United States,∂ China and Japan have all used maritime security∂ capacity building as part of their efforts to contribute to∂ regional security in Southeast Asia.∂ Finally, Canada could foster dialogue on cooperative∂ resource exploitation in disputed areas. Although the∂ marginal utility of Track-Two dialogues in East Asia is∂ on the decline due to their proliferation and a reduction∂ in earnest participation by Chinese participants, they∂ are not entirely without value. Canada could lead∂ discussions toward a regional fisheries management∂ organization for Southeast Asian waters. Similarly,∂ Canada could share its experience in maritime∂ boundary delimitation and resource development in∂ disputed waters. All East Asian claimant states have∂ rhetorically committed to this idea, but have been∂ unwilling to share jurisdiction in contested areas. In∂ one attempt, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking∂ agreement, Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine oil∂ companies collaborated in exploration activities in a∂ disputed area of the South China Sea. Although the∂ agreement collapsed due to domestic opposition in the∂ Philippines, this initiative was the deepest cooperation∂ witnessed among the South China Sea claimants, and∂ merits resuscitation with Canadian support.

### 1NC QQPQ Human rights and Democracy standards CP

#### The United States federal government should (the plan’s engagement with China) if and only if China makes meaningful changes to meet internationally recognized standards and rules on human rights and democracy.

#### China says yes---leveraging the plan’s engagement is key

Sherrod Brown 14, Senator (D-OH), currently serves on the Senate Finance, Banking, Agricultural, and Veterans Affairs Committees, and is chairman of the Congressional Executive Committee on China, "Senator Sherrod Brown on a Strategy of "Principled Resolve" Toward China", Council on Foreign Relations, Dec 2 2014, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/senator-sherrod-brown-strategy-principled-resolve-toward-china/p35811

So, anyway, enough of that. We see the influence every day of a rising China. We see what it means on alternative energy. We see China's involvement in Africa. We see China's increasing engagement in the Middle East and all over the world. We see in the products we buy from toys to electronics to pharmaceuticals to pet treats, we see increasing Chinese involvement in our economy. China's role in the U.N. Security Council affects our foreign policy announcements by President Obama this week both on trade and on climate change, underscores China's importance on these policy fronts, as well. More than any other nation, China will affect the worldwide economy—you know all this—global environment, geopolitical balance, in the decades to come. 2016 marks China's fifteen-year anniversary on the World Trade Organization. It marks the year when China's non-market economy status will be reviewed. But now is the time to take stock of our China strategy and re-evaluate our goals. We simply should not be waiting any longer. The U.S. must adopt a bolder, more holistic approach that pivots from an engaged "let's talk about it" tolerance to a principled resolve, from an engaged "let's talk about it" tolerance to a principled resolve. Let me give you an example. Several weeks ago, the Congressional Executive Commission on China, a bipartisan commission I chair that Lorne mentioned, which monitors human rights and rule of law in China created by Congress a decade-and-a-half ago, held a hearing on democracy in Hong Kong. Mark Lagon testified. Mark is, by the way, today—he said he's having—Mark's in the back—he's leaving—told me not to take it personally, but it's the last—before he joins Freedom Watch, it's the last class he teaches at Georgetown, so thanks for your service that way. But his testimony was very good. He was joined in that testimony, at least sort of joined, by Governor—by former Governor Lord Chris Patten, who was the last governor of Hong Kong, as you remember, the last British governor of Hong Kong who oversaw the 1997 handover to Britain. He argued—and Patten has not been terribly outspoken and critical over these years, as you know. He's—but he's now—he's arguing—he was from—we were Skyping it or whatever we were doing from London. He was arguing for a bolder approach. He said it's ridiculous to suggest that any attempt to stand up to our values means risking economic damage and our relationship with China. It's in a way encouraging China to behave badly. China's exports to the United States have gone up by 1,600 percent in these fifteen years, so Lord Patten asked, who needs—who needs whom? He told us that China's had seventeen years—since 1997, seventeen years to fulfill its promise of gradual and orderly progress towards democracy in Hong Kong, but then he said this is 2014, plenty of time for gradual and orderly progress toward democracy. Instead, China was giving Hong Kong—Patten's words again, Lord Patten's words—was giving Hong Kong a democracy like Iran's, where you can vote but the leadership decides whom you can vote for. That's not democracy. The people of Hong Kong shouldn't have to wait any longer. Again, Patten's contention; mine, too. Nor should we wait any longer. In recent years, our approach has been to sort of manage China's rise. We focus on integrating China into the international system, hoping its compliance with the rules would follow. Our strategy has been one of sort of engaged "let's talk about it", wait-and-see tolerance. What China fails—when China fails to live up to its obligations, we push back, sort of. We accept arguments from Chinese leaders if they're a developing country that needs time to reform. We see signs of progress even when there are only a few. We applaud change when it's only cosmetic. We give China chance after chance, pushing for increased engagement, even though China clearly intends to play by its own rules. Perhaps a decade ago, this was the right strategy. It was an appropriate strategy. Maybe it was a good strategy for us. Today it's no longer a strategy that works for our—for the rule of law, for our country, for the world economy. Currency manipulation is a good example of this approach. Year after year, U.S. Treasury said China's currency is significantly undervalued. Year after year, we give China chances to change their monetary policy. Year after year, we make excuses for their behavior. We make statements urging appreciation of the yuan. But we don't see much action, and we're the worse off for it. Up to 5 million American workers have lost jobs. Reputable mainstream economists will estimate literally up to 5 million American workers have lost jobs because of—because of the gaming of the currency system. Our trade deficit has grown by hundreds of billions of dollars due to currency manipulation. These workers can't wait any longer for China to appreciate its currency, and neither should we. Let's go back exactly fifteen years. Mike remembers those days clearly. Fifteen years ago right now, we were in the midst of the PNTR debate in the Senate, in the Senate and the House. I've never seen—I came to the House in '92, the Senate in '06. I've never seen the kind of intensive lobbying that we saw for PNTR. A friend of mine said there were more corporate jets at National Airport than any time in the last twenty years. CEOs who normally only—major company CEOs from Chrysler to Boeing to many others, normally meet with House and Senate leadership and a few powerful committee chairs. CEOs were walking the halls of Congress, even visiting the lowliest House freshmen on the fifth floor of Cannon. At the same time, they were—while walking the floors of Congress, while walking the halls of Congress, they talked about they wanted access to 1 billion Chinese customers. What they didn't say is they also wanted access to 1 billion potential Chinese workers. They promised economic growth, even though—they promised that economic growth would lead to a more democratic system, even though there were so many examples in world history that economic growth does not automatically lead to democracy. You can cite in the 20th century a number of examples where that simply hasn't worked out that way. For instance, an example. A major manufacturer in my old House district—I sat in his office. He lobbied me, talked over and over asking me to vote for PNTR. I did not, but he asked me to vote for PNTR. He said it will make his company be able to export more products, it will be good for his company, good for the workers and his company, good for our communities, good for the tax base, for the schools, for police protection, all the things that came from a growing manufacturing enterprise. PNTR passed. Three years later, he moved production to China. He stayed some in Ohio, but he moved a good bit of production to China. Again, I sat in his office. He said, the reason I moved to China is because my competitors are now in China, American companies that have moved to China, forgetting, again, that they changed the rules so that tax policy and trade policy made it—made these companies more likely to go. In fact, what we began to see, what was emerging in the United States a decade ago is a new way of doing business, where a company in the United States, a manufacturing company, it would shut down in Mansfield, Ohio, or in Steubenville, Ohio, and move to Wuhan or Shiyan, China, and then sell products back to the United States. As far as I can see—and there are historians and economists in this room—I've never heard anybody say otherwise. As far as I can see, that sort of business plan adopted wholesale by large American companies—small companies can't necessarily do that—adopted wholesale by large American companies that business plan of shutting down production in one country, moving abroad for a whole host of reasons, tax policy, trade policy, labor costs, environmental rules, worker rights, all those things. Companies that—that whole idea of a business plan of moving overseas and then selling products back into the original country is—as far as I can see, unprecedented in human history. Then now we get to the World—China's entry into the World Trade Organization. There are ongoing problems of illegal subsidies, a lack of transparency, discriminatory treatment of foreign corporations, and rampant intellectual property theft. The United States trade representative's annual report acknowledges all this, but does little about it. Yes, credit this administration—and I do on this—they filed more WTO cases than previous ones. I support that. I was speaking to Senator Portman last night on the phone about 9 o'clock, and he was—the other senator, Republican senator from Ohio—he was U.S. trade rep, as you remember. We have very different positions on trade, different votes, different positions, but we both talked about how we have had success together on trade enforcement. I give credit to the administration there, but little else in terms of making real progress on the bigger picture. We continue to engage in dialogue, but we still haven't seen results on China's misuse of its anti-monopoly law, Beijing's failure to protect intellectual property, overall industrial policy. We pay a heavy price, our workers, our communities. If any of you grew up in the Midwest and grew up in a town of 30,000 or 50,000 or 75,000 or 100,000, what was once a proud industrial town, you see—I don't blame it all on China. I don't blame it all on globalization. But you've seen what's happened to these communities. That's the kind of price we pay. In a 2011 study, the International Trade Commission estimated that if China adopted the same standard of intellectual property protection that we have in the United States, one of our proudest—one of the proudest features of our democracy and of our capitalist system—strong intellectual property protection—if China had the same standards we do, U.S. annual sales would increase by $107 billion, an additional 2 million jobs—more than 2 million jobs would be added to our economy. We can't wait for Beijing to decide whether they're really going to adopt high intellectual property standards. We need a new approach to China, instead of this sort of passive "let's talk about it," dialogue-driven tolerance, we need principled resolve. A policy of principled resolve means we make clear what international obligations we expect China, a country that says it will engage in the rule of law, follow the rule of law, we expect China to meet on cybersecurity, and the obligation we expect them to meet on cybersecurity, human rights, international trade, worker rights. Then we demand China meet those standards now. They could issue more visas to foreign journalists. They could stop censoring media, now. They can—they can release political prisoners. They can shut down labor camps. They can start respecting the rights of the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities now. They could let their currency appreciate. They could take explicit permanent steps to comply with WTO obligations, which they promised, as they promised Lord Patten in Hong Kong, take explicit permanent steps to comply with their WTO obligations, today. Increased engagement by the U.S. may have led to more agreements on paper, but we tolerate infraction after infraction after infraction. Under a policy of principled resolve, before we sign a bilateral investment treaty—we can talk about that later—or any other trade agreements with China, we demand China comply with its existing international obligations and its domestic laws. That includes giving workers the right to organize independent unions. It includes effectively enforcing environmental laws. China still will have none of that. Given all at stake for its—all that is at stake for the U.S., why give China more opportunities to fail to live up to commitments? We push for progress on an issue-by-issue basis, but we don't step back to evaluate how our conversations on trade should also, for example, address China's persistent human rights violations. A principled resolve strategy recognizes that concerns about trade and human rights all stem from the same source: China's lack of respect for international standards, China's unwillingness to comply with the rule of law. We must not treat these issues separately in the vain hope that improvement on market access eventually leads to the better treatment of Tibetans. You remember the discussions as I mentioned in 1999, as CEOs walked the halls of Congress, that more prosperous China will mean a China—a more democratic China that respects the rule of law and human rights. That's what our CEOs told us. That's what the Chinese told us, for all the reasons we talk about, that those haven't been met. If China doesn't respect the human rights of its own people, how do you expect—how do we expect China to respect the agreements with—which we sign with them? Every year, the Congressional Executive Commission on China issues a report—and Lawrence Liu is here, whom I just wanted to call out for the terrific work he's done as staff director in that commission. Issues were reported detailing the extent to which China's failed to comply with its international human rights obligations. I encourage each of you to read the latest version, which we released in October. A couple things—a couple highlights. This year's report, we found the human rights situation has gotten even worse under President Xi Jinping. President Xi has targeted moderate reformers. They've delayed and denied visas for foreign journalists. They've waged a campaign against church buildings. They've trampled on the rights of Tibetans and Uighurs. We've had a number of—a number of people come in and testify, including a young woman from Indiana University, whose father was just—whose father—whose family are Uighurs and whose father just was imprisoned again by the Chinese and clearly mistreated. We've heard testimony from people, from journalists, from others who have been affected by what the commission cites as human rights situation getting worse. The commission maintains an extensive political prisoner database, now identifies 1,300 known political prisoners by name detained in the People's Republic of China. Many of those were detained under President Xi during one of the harshest crackdown on human rights activists in recent history. We can't wait to see if China's next leader will change course. Last month, other—the co-chair of the commission, Chris Smith, and I did what nobody had done before. That is, we introduced legislation together as the two chairs of the commission, a bipartisan coalition of a number of senators, Senator Cardin and Rubio and Wicker and others, and House members to renew U.S. support for Hong Kong's democracy and freedom. We've spoken with one voice. We've reminded China that the U.S. and the world are watching. Look at what's happening in Taipei in the last few days. Look what's happening in their elections. Look what's happening on the streets of Hong Kong. Our China policy needs to include other bold steps that clearly identify our commitment to these international standards, whether it's standards on human rights or democracy or labor rights or religious freedoms, and we must require China to comply. Unless we start holding China accountable, in a coordinated, comprehensive way, it will continue to offer lukewarm, short-lived progress on individual issues, only to roll back these temporary achievements later, whether it's currency, whether it's these other issues. We continue—we can't continue to applaud ongoing dialogue, which is kind of what we do—we talk about it, we applaud them for meeting, we applaud them for the discussions and the promises, but the commitments themselves don't seem to hold up. We must identify our goals for China. We must firmly pursue them, engaging—withholding engagement or benefits if China doesn't agree to meet the high standards for the global leader, which they are, and which they especially aspire to be. Now, China's been in the WTO for thirteen years. It's a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It has a responsibility to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It sees itself as a great power. It's time it acted like the global leader that it has economically and militarily become. The U.S. should no longer value engagement, discussions, said talks, whatever, over results. Letting the yuan appreciate marginally only to depreciate significantly a month later is simply not good enough. Blocking and censoring U.S. websites while Chinese tech companies raise billions on our capital markets should no longer be acceptable. Talking about, having dialogue on human rights without releasing political prisoners, without shutting down the labor camps, without protecting workers, without respecting the rights of minorities, ethnic minorities shouldn't be tolerated. We should forcefully call out China whenever it violates international standards and norms. We should condition additional agreements and commitments with Beijing on meaningful progress in fundamentally critical areas of human rights and democracy. We should not accept half-measures and cosmetic improvements. We've done that for over a decade. Under a new approach of principled resolve, we simply can't do that. The China we say—China will say we're interfering in their internal affairs. They say we have no right to speak up for universal values in Hong Kong or defend the rights of journalists there. They'll continue to silence our companies doing business in their country, and our companies have been far too complicit in this for a decade, too. Things are changing, but James Mann and I were talking about how things have begun to change that way. We will see. And they will continue to prevent our government from bringing trade cases by hacking into our computers and threatening retaliation. That's why it's so important to do this right. China will weaken international standards further if we don't. It will rewrite the rules that will make their unfair trading practices acceptable and their violations of human rights far too legitimate. There's no question that engagement will be a fundamental part of the relationship, but the U.S. must realize that we still have a lot of leverage. And that's what the U.S. has—I think has missed in our China policy over the last decade. The leverage is the largest, most lucrative, golden market in the world—in world history, that's our leverage with China. They want access to our markets, our technologies, our universities. The heft of the U.S. government and our consumers can be used, if we choose to, to achieve real change in China. Under a principled resolve approach, our dialogue, our agreements with China cannot come at the expense of our economy or international human rights standards. Benefits from our relationship with China will accrue to workers where we won trade cases at the U.S. Steel in Lorain, Ohio, at TMK Ipsco in Brookfield, Ohio, at Vallourec in Youngstown, Ohio, not just multinational companies, not just Chinese state-owned enterprises. The U.S. will push China to follow through on its announced abolition of re-education through labor camps and demand an end to crackdown on freedom of speech and freedom of religion. With a principled resolve strategy, the U.S. will not be afraid to speak out or to pursue aggressive policies. We'll make clear that if China wants our cooperation, it wants access to our markets, it must play by internationally recognized rules.

#### Chinese political decay is inevitable absent reform---causes laundry list of problems

Minxin Pei 06, a senior associate and the director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "China: Can Economic Growth Continue without Political Reform?", Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade Interdependence, and Security, pp. 303-331. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006, content.csbs.utah.edu/~mli/Economics%205420-6420/Pei\_SA06\_ChinaReform\_preview.pdf

Accelerated Political Decay The ability of the CCP to overcome its manifold challenges depends to a critical degree on whether the party can effectively stop and reverse the political decay that, based on the symptoms and scope of corruption, appears to be well-advanced. The record of autocratic regimes in combating corruption, however, inspires little confidence. Because of several factors - dysfunctional mechanisms of political accountability, the suppression of both freedom of press and civil liberties, and the rule by man rather than by law - a monopolistic ruling party is extremely unlikely to be able to restrain the predatory behavior of its agents without introducing reforms that would empower civil society or strengthen the rule of law. If such is the case in China, the process of political decay will only accelerate in the decade to come. Accelerated political decay inevitably will sap China's economic vigor. Corruption will weaken China's most vital economic organs, especially financial services (including banking) and infrastructure, which are critical to future growth. Shady deals in the privatization of state-owned assets and in real estate development will deprive the state of much-needed revenues while enriching well-connected individuals. Pervasive crony-capitalistic practices will protect the vested interests of rent-seekers, thus limiting market competition and perpetuating inefficiency. Political decay will undermine the Chinese state's capacity to cope with environmental degradation and public health crises because a corrupt officialdom habitually conceals information, covers up mistakes, and takes slow and inadequate actions against these threats to public welfare. Ironically, the greatest victim of accelerated political decay would be the CCP itself, as the ruling party. The spread of collusive corruption within the party will fragment the CCP's authority and allow local elites to usurp party power. Once entrenched, networks formed by collusive officials would grow resistant to purges and anti-corruption campaigns launched by the central government. As its agents' own parochial interests diverge the corporate interests of the CCP, the ruling party also will face increasing difficulty in implementing policies, having neither the means to mot party agents nor the coercive instruments to force compliance. To the extant that corruption worsens socioeconomic inequality and de-legitimizes ruling elites, political decay will further alienate the Chinese people the CCP and further fuel social frustrations. Enfeebled from within unloved by its own people, the CCP would be precariously positioned to weather the political and economic shocks made more likely by the process of accelerated political decay itself. We may thus rule out the scenario of "Liberal Dream" (a strong democratic China transformed through peaceful evolution) and of "Authoritarian Nightmare" (an economically and militarily powerful China ruled by a thoroughly unreconstructed autocracy). Given pathologies embedded in a post-communist authoritarian regime, most likely scenario for China would be either a frail autocratic giant weak new democracy. Yet the current policies of the West are based either on the "Liberal Dream" scenario (which justifies engagement) or on "Authoritarian Nightmare" scenario (which calls for covert containment euphemistically, "strategic hedging"). Little serious thought or intellectual exercise appears to have been devoted to scenarios of a weak China, either democratic or authoritarian. Has China's past economic performance so dazzling that those in the West have grown complacent and dismissive of China's underlying institutional flaws and frailties? If so, such complacency is irresponsible because these flaws-now more than just obvious inevitably derail China's rise. For the global economy in general, and China's chief trading partner in particular, an economically faltering China would have serious practical consequences. Many of the rosy long-term scenarios of the growth in demand within China would not materialize . The price of commodities would likely fall as well. The much-feared oil shortage, based almost entirely on China's unquenchable thirst, would unlikely come true. In geopolitical terms, the critical bilateral relationships now cultivated by China with African, Latin American, and Asian countries likely would undergo gradual erosion; an economically stagnant China would not be able to underwrite these relationships with economic benefits (such as direct investments, aid, and imports), thus disappointing the countries in these regions that may have counted on China as an economic counterweight to the West. China would see its geopolitical influence quickly plummet in these regions. ln Asia, China might find itself experiencing the same setback dealt to Japan after the bursting of the bubble economy in the 1990s. Beijing's capacity to wield economic power to gain influence in Asia would likely be undercut severely. Should India's economic rise continue at its current rapid pace, Asia's regional leadership role would migrate from Beijing to New Delhi Similarly, the business community in the West would experience a rude awakening as a result of such a scenario. Having bet heavily on China both as a source of demand for their products and as an offshore manufacturing center, these companies could find that strategies pursued on this basis fail to deliver the promised economic rewards. Subsequent re-thinking of the China market by these companies could lead to a dramatic curtailment of direct investment in, and sourcing from, China-a step that, while surely further exacerbating China's economic woes, nonetheless would fully reflect the habitual fickleness of foreign capital. China's relations with the West would likely deteriorate, not merely as a result of Beijing's declining economic importance but also because disappointed Western businesses would be much less willing to defend China's interests in their local capital . Depending on the specific scenarios under which China's economic decline were to unfold, Beijing quite conceivable might accuse Western businesses and investors (especially hedge funds) of conspiring against the Chinese economy and causing the decline, a strategy that would help focus the attention of the Chinese public elsewhere but could further alienate Western businessmen and their politicians. China's economic faltering would be a mixed blessing for the United States. The security threat envisioned by the Pentagon's planners would disappear, with China's military modernization grinding to a halt due to a lack of resources. Washington would no longer fear China's expanding influence in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The United States, however, would suffer economically. Because of close economic interdependence between China and the United States, any significant economic decline in China would diminish U.S. access to markets, cheap credit, and profitable investments. More important would be that China's weakness would stimulate new non-traditional security threats that would emerge-potentially including risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, massive environmental degradation, public health disasters, drug trafficking, illegal migration, money launder and counterfeiting. In many respects, the United States would have more difficulty addressing these threats since all originate within China and protected by Chinese borders. Unless Washington finds a strong partner the Chinese government, the United States would have few effective tools to contain these threats directly. Since the West's economic and security interests would suffer significantly should China's economy falter as a result of the country’s political stagnation, the strategic interests of the West would be best served by a rethinking of the current approach to China and an adjustment to the strategy of focusing on economic engagement as the principal instrument integrating China into the global community. The current approach, though having yielded rich dividends in the last three decades, also has shown its limits, especially in helping transform the Chinese political system. A new approach, emphasizing China's domestic political reform as a bench of its integration with the West, would better serve Western interests. Western governments and businesses would do well to work as partners, not adversaries, to better protect long-term interests in China; rather hoping for modernization-induced political change, the new course would aggressively promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

#### CCP will lash out---causes nuclear war with US and Japan.

Chang 2014

Gordon C., Distinguished Senior Fellow, Gatestone Institute, China on the Edge, 4/16/2014, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4269/china-on-the-edge

The country has entered an especially troubling phase, and we have to be concerned that Beijing—out of fundamental weakness and not out of strength—will lash out and shake the world. So what happened in the past decade? To understand China's new belligerent external policies, we need to look inside the country, and we might well start with the motor of its rise: its economy. Everyone knows China's growth is slowing. Yet what is not obvious is that it is slowing so fast that the economy could fail. The Chinese economy almost failed in June. There were extraordinary events that month including two waves of bank defaults. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the country's largest bank—the world's largest bank—was obviously in distress: it even had to shut down its ATMs and online banking platforms to conserve cash. The Bank of China, the country's third-largest lender, was also on the edge of default. There was panic in China in June, but central government technocrats were able to rescue the economy by pouring even more state money into "ghost cities" and high-speed-rail-lines-to-nowhere. Doing so created gross domestic product—economic output—but that was the last thing Beijing should have been doing at that—or this—moment. China, at every level of government, is funding all its construction with new debt. You think America has a debt problem; China's is worse. As one economist told us recently, every province in China is a Greece. China, after the biggest boom in history, is heading into what could end up as the biggest debt crisis in history. This is not a coincidence. Soon, there must be a reckoning because the flatlined economy is not able to produce sufficient growth to pay back debt. If we ignore official statistics and look at independent data—such as private surveys, corporate results, and job creation numbers—we see an economy that cannot be expanding in the high single digits as Beijing claims. How fast is the country really growing? In 2012—the last year for which we have a full set of employment statistics—the number of jobs in China increased 0.37% over 2011. This indicates that China could not have grown by more than 2.0% In 2013's third quarter, preliminary surveys show the number of jobs decreased 2.5% from Q3 in 2012 and 4.0% from Q2 2013. That is an indication that China's economy has already begun to contract both year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter. And why are China's severe economic problems relevant to us? Because for more than three decades the Communist Party has primarily based its legitimacy on the continual delivery of prosperity. And without prosperity, the only remaining basis of legitimacy is nationalism. The People's Liberation Army, which is configuring itself to fight the United States, is the embodiment of that nationalism. China's militant nationalism is creating friction in an arc of nations from India in the south to South Korea in the north. Let us focus on the Philippines and Japan. Nearly two years ago, Chinese vessels surrounded and seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. Washington, not wanting to antagonize Beijing and hoping to avoid a confrontation, did nothing to stop the Chinese taking over the shoal despite our mutual defense treaty with Manila. The Chinese, however, were not satisfied with their seizure. They are now pressuring Second Thomas Shoal and other Philippine territory, also in the South China Sea. Beijing claims about 80% of that critical body of international water as an internal Chinese lake. As soon as the Chinese took Scarborough, they began to increase pressure on Japan's Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The barren outcroppings are claimed and administered by Japan, but Beijing, which calls them the Diaoyus, claims them as well. As a matter of international law, the claim of the People's Republic is weak—Beijing acknowledged they were Japanese until 1971, when it first asserted sovereignty over them. Yet the weakness of the claim is not the problem. Many countries pursue weak territorial claims. The problem is China's tactics. Beijing is using forceful tactics to try to take the Senkakus, regularly sending its ships into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the islands and sometimes flying planes into Japanese airspace there. Many people ask why the Japanese should care about eight barren outcroppings. The reason is that the Chinese are acting like classic aggressors. They were not satisfied with Scarborough, so they ramped up pressure on the Senkakus. They will not be happy with just the Senkakus. Chinese policymakers—and state media—are now arguing that Beijing should claim Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu chain. And recently, Beijing expanded its Air-Defense Identification Zone to include airspace over Japan's sovereign territory, a clearly hostile act and one that can lead to conflict. There has been a noticeable increase in the tempo of China's territorial incursions during the last year. This uptick has generally coincided with the elevation of Xi Jinping as China's new ruler in November 2012. Of course, we all want to understand what is going on inside Beijing's political circles and what is causing this new aggressiveness. There are two theories. First, some think Xi Jinping has quickly consolidated control and that he is really an ardent nationalist, that he is the one pushing the military to act aggressively. There is some support for this conclusion because it has been repeatedly reported that he is personally directing Beijing's hostile campaign to take the Senkakus. Even some in the Xi-is-strong camp acknowledge the incompleteness of the leadership transition, however. For instance, Kenneth Lieberthal of Brookings, who is one of Xi's defenders, believes that the new leader is a domestic reformer but cannot get on the wrong side of the ugly nationalism the Party has fostered in the past. Lieberthal believes Xi is allowing the military to engage in provocative behavior so that he will have the political capital to push through economic reforms at home. Second, others, including me, believe the transition has not been completed. More than Lieberthal, I see a weak leader who does not control the military. People who share this view, which is a minority one, are concerned that flag officers are either making their own policies independently of China's civilian leaders, or essentially telling civilian leaders what policies they will adopt. In short, I believe we should be careful speaking of "Beijing this" or "Beijing that," but should be looking instead at the factional messiness inside the Communist Party and realizing that the People's Liberation Army is now the Party's most powerful faction. Xi Jinping has, in fact, no faction of his own. People say he heads the "Princelings," but that term merely describes sons and daughters of either former leaders or high officials. These offspring have views that span the political spectrum and do not form a cohesive group. Xi became China's supreme leader because he appealed to all factions, in large part because he had no faction. He was, in short, the least unacceptable candidate. And because he still has no identifiable faction, he cannot afford to offend the generals and admirals, who, in my view have been driving the bus for some time. Some political analysts even joke that the military is now Xi Jinping's faction. In any event, China's external policies are of deep concern. It is not just that Beijing is hostile; its foreign policy now makes little sense. In the past, Beijing threw tantrums and even started wars when it wanted to punish a neighbor. Chinese leaders were always smart enough to direct their anger at just one or two targets to make sure they got what they wanted. And many times they were successful. Today, Beijing is taking on many others, all at the same time, especially countries to its south and its east and the United States. How many adversaries does a country need? The Party is lashing out, and that is not a good sign. If nothing else, it betrays a lack of strategic thinking. It is not promoting worldwide revolution, as it did in the early years of the People's Republic, but it is trying to upend the existing international order, something that Mao also attempted. So we have to be prepared to face the fact that China is no longer a status quo power. Is China really going back to its Maoist origins? On the face of it, this sounds absurd. Almost everybody believes China has left its past forever, but that belief does not accord with the facts. The Chinese political system, thanks to Xi Jinping, is now going on a bender, with his Maoist and Marxist "mass line" campaigns, one right after the other; his prolonged attack on civil society; and his new movement promoting "ideological purification." If the dominant view is correct—that Xi Jinping is now firmly in control of China—it means that he must really believe in his extremist positions. Either way, Xi is roiling Chinese politics at the moment. For one thing, he is purging political opponents under the guise of a crackdown on corruption. One of these probes, against Zhou Yongkang, breaks the most sacred rule of Chinese communist politics. To heal the Party's grievous wounds caused by Mao Zedong's decade-long Cultural Revolution, leaders in the early part of the 1980s, after the trial of the Gang of Four, decided that no member or former member of the Politburo Standing Committee could be investigated. Those at the apex of political power were immune from prosecution. The theory was that if leaders knew they would not be hunted down, as they were in the Cultural Revolution, they would be willing to withdraw gracefully after losing political struggles. In other words, Deng Xiaoping, Mao's crafty successor, reduced the incentive for political figures to fight to the end and, as a result, tear the Communist Party apart. Xi Jinping, however, is reversing the process and upping the stakes, something evident in the tribulations of Mr. Zhou, the former internal security chief, as well as the more famous Bo Xilai, once China's most openly ambitious politician, who is now serving a life term after an incompetently run show trial last August. The widespread use of criminal penalties is a sign that China is returning to a period that many thought was long past. Last year, then Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China could descend into another Cultural Revolution. Observers at the time thought he was being melodramatic. He probably was not. China is on the edge, taking wrong turns at the moment. Most foreign policy establishments in Washington and other capitals are doing their best to ignore what is happening in Beijing. They have always hoped that China could become a partner for the U.S., rather than another Soviet Union or, worse, a 1930s Germany or Japan. And this leads us to the central question in Sino-U.S. ties today: How are we going to develop good relations with a China that, out of weakness or strength, is roiling the world? Almost everyone says we need to talk to the Chinese because we talked to the Soviets. Talking, the argument goes, will build good relations or, at the very least, will avoid miscommunications and misunderstandings. The argument sounds compelling. After all, who can be against good relations? Who can be in favor of miscommunication and misunderstanding? Since the early 1970s, however, the U.S. has talked to China in every conceivable format, formal and informal, bilateral and multilateral, secret and announced. Discussions have been held in Washington and Beijing and many places in between. There have been state visits, the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, and even the "shirtsleeves summit" in southern California in June. During the previous administration, the number of ongoing bilateral forums between China and the U.S. reached fifty. Today, there are about 90 of them. Yet as the interactions between American and Chinese officials have increased dramatically during the Obama administration and the last one, ties between the two nations have remained strained. Obviously something is wrong. We have talked about what is wrong in China. We also need to think about what is wrong on our side. There are three things we are getting wrong. First, we do not understand how the Chinese think. We fervently believe that if we try hard enough, the Chinese will have to respond in kind. This is a product of our reasoning that we are people, the Chinese are people, we respond to gestures of friendship, so the Chinese will respond favorably to our friendly gestures. By now we should have learned that this line of reasoning, which has a surface logic to it, is faulty because it has not in fact produced good outcomes. Chinese leaders do not distrust us because they have insufficient contact with us. They distrust us because they see themselves as the protector of an ideology threatened by free societies. The mistrust is inherent in their one-party state. It can never be relieved as long as the Communist Party remains in power. As Ronald Reagan taught us, the nature of regimes matters. In short, illiberal regimes cannot maintain enlightened foreign policies, at least over the long term. So we should not be surprised that China cannot compromise or maintain good relations with its neighbors, the international community, with us. The second thing we get wrong about China is that we believe that it is safe to ignore periodic Chinese threats to incinerate our cities and wage war on us, like the reports that appeared in state media in October 2013 boasting how Chinese submarines can launch missiles with nuclear warheads that can kill tens of millions of Americans. These are real threats and every time we fail to respond to them, the concept of deterrence erodes. Already, Shen Dengli of Fudan University in Shanghai tells us, in public, that we have "no guts" to stand up to China. Bad things happen when your adversary does not respect you. The third thing we get wrong about China is that we think is it inadvisable to call the Chinese out in public. In 2012, for instance, we learned that the Chinese military sold the North Koreans at least six transporter-erector-launchers—TELs—for their newest missile, the KN-08. And we said nothing to the Chinese in public. Why is that omission important? Because we are not that concerned at this moment with North Korea's longest-range launchers being used as weapons. These launchers take weeks to transport, assemble, fuel, and test. We can destroy them on the pad. We are, however, concerned about the nuclear-capable, road-mobile KN-08, which can hide and shoot. We should remember that the Pentagon last March cited the KN-08 as one of the principal reasons for going ahead with 14 additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. So Beijing substantially increased North Korea's ability to wage nuclear war on us, and we acted as if it did not matter. Personally speaking, not offending the Chinese is low on my list of priorities. And our bashfulness has other consequences. The Chinese, with justification, complain that we are not being transparent with them about the "pivot." We keep on saying that the pivot has nothing to do with them, yet we are rotating B-52s through Australia and B-52s and B-2s through Guam and the Chinese have to be asking what that is all about. We need to be able to say, in public and in clear tones, that the pivot is all about them, that the pivot is about ensuring peace and stability in the region and they are the ones threatening it. If we cannot say those things clearly, the Chinese will think we are afraid of them. If they think we are afraid of them, they will act accordingly. I repeat: bad things happen when your adversary does not respect you. Let me put all that we have just talked about into context. Chinese leaders, it is true, have not launched a large-scale invasion since 1979. Instead, they employ salami-slicing tactics, to grab territory in increments, so that they do not invite retaliation. For instance, they successfully salami-sliced Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese were not the first to use this clever stratagem. We actually know where they learned this because the Chinese were the victims of these same tactics. The hardline Japanese military in the 1930s kept grabbing chunks of northeastern China. The Chinese then were continually pushed back and humiliated. In the second half of 1937, there was a feeling in Chinese circles that, although Nationalist forces were no match for Japan's, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to fight back. Chiang ultimately made his stand after Japanese soldiers fired on his troops in July of that year in a minor—and undoubtedly accidental—scrap at the Marco Polo Bridge, a few miles southwest of what is now the Chinese capital. This is, of course, a lesson for us today. The parallels between then and now are striking. Then, the Japanese military, like the Chinese military today, was emboldened by success and was ultra-nationalist. Then, like now, civilians controlled Asia's biggest army only loosely. Then, the media publicized the idea that Japan was being surrounded by hostile powers that wished to prevent its rise. That is exactly what the Communist Party says today about China. Instead of ignoring Beijing's current salami tactics, as Washington does, we should be alive to the fact that countries on China's periphery, pushed to the limit by Beijing's unrelenting belligerence, could very well be forced into the same decision that Chiang Kai-shek made in 1937, to resist aggression with force of arms. Let us all remember, World War II started not on the plains of Europe in 1939 but near Beijing two years before. We live in an era defined by the absence of major war, but this peace may not last. At this moment, we do not know whether a Chinese political system in turmoil will drive the country to become the aggressor of the 21st century, but we should be prepared.

### 1NC CFIUS Transparency CP

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should insist that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States publish its decisions and explain the rationale behind them.

#### Transparency solves

Deborah Lehr, February 13, 2015, Deborah Lehr is a writer for the Paulson Institute, “Why a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters,” http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/paulson-blog/2015/02/13/why-a-us-china-bilateral-investment-treaty-matters/

China’s trade negotiators were recently in Washington to continue negotiations towards a bilateral investment treaty between China and the United States. Much still remains to be hammered out: China plans to submit its “negative list”—sectors that will not be opened to foreign competition—after the Chinese New Year, and then tough negotiations will ensue. But the momentum for concluding a treaty is growing—and that is a good thing. A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the United States and China is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the world stage, it’s important for the United States to work with China and to support their entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. To delve into the importance of a bilateral investment treaty to both countries, the Paulson Institute—with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the US-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation—convened a US-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement to both countries. The discussions included the US Secretary of Commerce, the US Trade Representative, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chinese Ambassador, as well as leading US and Chinese CEOs, Mayors and high level opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensued about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China continue to be part of the rules based systems on trade. As a former US trade negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed first hand how bringing China into the rules based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s, one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, China’s trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and US companies. Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced. China’s WTO accession provided a ten-year road map for opening and reform of China’s economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition. And both countries benefited from this transparency. Low cost Chinese exports to the United States have increased over 330 percent since the signing of the agreement. And US exports to China rose by 533 percent since China’s accession. Yet that ten-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard bilateral investment treaty can fill the resulting gap. It would bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A bilateral investment treaty would be good for China because the required opening of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious plan to transform its economic model away from export led growth to a more consumption based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for Chinese companies investing in the United States. And why would a bilateral investment treaty be good for the United States? For one, it would create a more transparent and level playing field for US companies in China, leading to greater opportunities for US investors. It would also encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of the Chinese government’s “going out” initiative to encourage overseas investment. This in turn, would create jobs and opportunities for American workers. There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the United States and China. So far, Chinese actual investment in the United States, less than $4 billion in 2014, is less than 5 percent of the $101 billion that China invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the United States might open the doors to more money coming in, creating new jobs. US investment in China, more than $50 billion, no doubt would increase as the playing field becomes more level. President Xi has set out an ambitious economic reform agenda; just as Premier Zhu Rongji had done at the time of China’s WTO accession. China’s large-scale state owned enterprises and cheap exports are no longer reaping the economic gains they once did. The United States has a unique opportunity to work with China on a new roadmap for future growth.

#### Their evidence says transparency solves

Doug Peterson, July 27, 2015, Doug Peterson is the president and CEO of McGraw Hill Financial., “China And The U.S. Need To Come Together--At Least Economically,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/07/27/china-and-the-u-s-need-to-come-together-at-least-economically/#6b32691923d3

China’s growth has slowed in recent quarters. Yet with about 20% of the world’s population in China, the opportunities are vast, the talent pool is highly qualified, and American businesses want to invest. It’s crucial we get this relationship right and engage at all levels in a productive and cooperative dialogue. We must continue to make progress on all fronts to support economic growth that will augment China’s enormous unleashed potential as an economic partner. China’s economy expanded seven percent year-on-year in the second quarter, official data showed on July 15, beating expectations but with weak investment and trade acting as a drag. We’ve taken some steps, but we need to go further The recent vote in the Senate to give President Barack Obama a key tool in negotiating the Trans-Pacific Parnternship, which will allow him to create the best environment for U.S. businesses operating in the region, was an important one. But TPP excludes China, a country with which we need that same level of bilateral investment cooperation. That’s why leaders from both countries gathered last month for the seventh session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The talks come at a crucial time for both countries, as China and the U.S. face economic challenges that greater cooperation could help mitigate. The U.S. has reached 36-year lows in economic growth and labor force participation; China is wrestling with a “new normal” of slower economic growth and rising public sector debt. Both countries share a competitive spirit that’s alive and well among their people, and both want policies to match that enthusiasm. These dialogues were the right place for finding solutions, and the last six meetings have helped make progress on critical issues such as a bilateral investment treaty. At McGraw Hill Financial, we’ve been doing business with China for more than 20 years. We’re now faced with an opportunity for the world’s two largest economies to come together for mutual economic benefit. We hope to see progress in three key areas: a U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, infrastructure finance and pro-trade policies. How bilateral investment would improve the economy A U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) would foster investment in each country by reducing the barrier to entry for foreign investors. For U.S. investors, this treaty would have several benefits. It would prevent China from favoring its own companies at the expense of U.S. business; it would open investment into industries that are largely restricted today; and it would establish dispute resolution procedures to help investors negotiate with the Chinese government. Encouraging the free exchange of U.S. and Chinese business will also create more jobs in America. Chinese companies accounted for 70,000 U.S. full-time jobs in 2013, more than eight times the figure for 2007. More of this business means more U.S. jobs, as well as expanded opportunities and protections for U.S. investors. Recommended by Forbes Forget The TPP, Let's Talk About The BIT With China Where Is China's Missing 1,850 Tons Of Gold? Colorado Office of Economic DevelopmentVoice: Army Explosives Vet Finds Peace And Career As Colorado Fishing Guide A New Blueprint For Economic Architecture In The Asia-Pacific MOST POPULAR Photos: The Cities With The Most Billionaires +75,201 VIEWS Want To Retire In Your 30s And Travel The World? This Woman Did Furthermore, increased capital flows from the implementation of a BIT would address the projected global shortfall in government spending on infrastructure. The U.S. and China are in dire need of infrastructure upgrades, and both could see economic returns from doing so. Every $1 allocated for infrastructure in China generates $2.20 in real gross domestic product over three years, while generating $1.70 for every $1 allocated in the U.S., according to research from Standard & Poor’s. China has already taken steps in this direction It is encouraging that China is taking a leadership role to boost infrastructure investment in the region through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China and the U.S. should also discuss how to collaborate to effectively bring infrastructure investment to developing Asia. Not all of this has to come from public financing. A BIT would increase investor confidence in the security of their Chinese investments, but private investors may still hesitate without more information on long-term investments. Public-private partnerships have a track record of success in the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada and the Netherlands, and these projects owe much of their success to a greater standardization of project finance structures in those countries. Already, China has been a leader among emerging nations by opening capital markets to foreign investment, and increasing transparency and available information on public investments is a natural next step. Open markets are crucial Finally, leaders should use the recent dialogue to emphasize the importance of market access to goods, services and investment. Both countries are pursuing regional and multilateral trade liberalization policies, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the U.S. and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in China. I urge both countries to support another Doha Development Round to further express support for increased global trade dialogue. China’s willingness to open its markets to foreign trade will benefit its economy and be a positive example to other developing countries. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy will benefit from access to China’s markets and use its own dynamic and vibrant capital markets as a strong example of why it’s important to embrace these types of policies. Progress on a BIT, infrastructure finance and pro-trade policies would demonstrate to the world that keystone economies can work together to adapt to the changing global environment. Furthermore, it would build on an important and profitable relationship. In 1979, total two-way trade between the U.S. and China was just $2 billion. Last year, it was $590 billion. For both economies to realize their full potential, trade volumes need to surpass $700 billion by 2020. The new economy requires bilateral investment In the last 25 years we’ve seen a new world take hold, one where money moves at the speed of light and old systems get replaced in a flash. Our dynamic people know this and have adapted to this new reality, and are working hard to capitalize on the potential it holds. Our collective populations deserve public policy that makes it easier to do this. Right now neither country is delivering. We can find mutually beneficial common ground. A bilateral investment treaty, infrastructure finance and pro-trade posture are good places to start.

### 1nc Consult Japan CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Japan on whether or not the United States federal government should [[plan]]. The United States federal government will advocate the proposal during consultation and abide by the outcome of consultation.

#### Japan says yes—they have a fundamental interest in enhanced US engagement with China

**Hughes 16**

Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in PAIS, Research Associate at Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, degrees from Universities of Oxford, Rochester, and Sheffield (Christopher, Japan’s Resentful Realism and Balancing China’s Rise, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Summer 2016, P. 109-150, <http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#sec-2>)//SJ

Might Japan’s international strategy shift radically, or indeed is it already beginning a radical shift in response to China’s rise? How might such a shift exert impact, long-term, on Sino–Japanese security relations, and US-led attempts to ‘rebalance’ the regional security order? Might Japanese ‘Revisionist’ governments even actively and overtly balance against China? Japan clearly maintains a fundamental interest in the rise of China, possible associated disturbances in the overall international system and East Asian regional order and, most especially, the prospect of US unipolarity being displaced by a new multipolarity, or even China’s eventual challenge for hegemonic dominance.[1](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-1) Japan’s vital interest in these developments is, of course, intensified all the more by its close geographical proximity to China, and interdependence of political, economic, and security interests; and by its position in the post-war period as essentially a status quo power supportive of the continuation of the US-led international order, and bound to the US by an ever-deepening alliance relationship. The expectation should be that any shifts in the US-led international and regional systems in which Japan has been so firmly embedded, and as precipitated by China, should pose questions about the precipitation of a similar counter-reaction from Japan. The more radical the impact of China on the regional order, the more proportionately radical Japan’s response might be. Japan may choose to channel its response via the US–Japan alliance, and this may bolster the US security presence in the Asia-Pacific. Alternatively, if Chinese hegemony is truly perceived as on the cards, then this might be considered as necessitating Japan’s initiation of a counter-hegemonic strategy, either in conjunction with or separate from the USA—all with potential ramifications for stability as the two largest East Asian states contend over the shape of the regional security order. Thus far, however, Japan’s reaction to China’s rise has been regarded—so the public argument goes for the majority of Japanese and US policymakers and commentators—as highly restrained, and as demonstrating no fundamental change in Japanese international strategy.[2](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-2) Japanese policymakers, such as current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, even as they work to revise national security strategies and military capabilities to guard against China’s rise—most notably the Abe government’s passing in September 2015 of extensive legislation to overturn the 60-year-old ban on the exercise of collective self-defence to expand the range of military support for the US–Japan alliance—utilize language to describe such strategy as a ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi), so to stress essential continuity with the demilitarized post-war past rather than change. Abe has argued in National Diet policy speeches that ‘the peaceful rise of China offers a great opportunity for Japan as well as for the international community. Under the principle of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” (senryaku-teki gokei kankei), we will further strengthen the trend of improving relations’.[3](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-3) Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) maintains the official position that, despite various bilateral ‘differences’, especially over territorial and maritime security, ‘Stable Japan-China relations are essential not only to the citizens of both countries, but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as whole. Accordingly, based on the concept of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests”, the Government of Japan will promote the development of Japan-China relations from a broad perspective through continued dialogues and cooperation at various levels.’[4](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-4) Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 stressed that, even in response to China’s perceived attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, ‘Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalation’, so claiming that it would not be the power to break the status quo.[5](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-5) Meanwhile, US–Japan alliance managers and insiders flatly reiterate the mantra that Japan remains a disciplined partner in any hedging strategy towards China.[6](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-6) From the perspective of Neo-realism, many analysts agree that Japan has so far failed to react to the changing international structure or to display either significant balancing, or less probable bandwagoning behaviour, vis-à-vis China’s rise. Japan’s apparent lack of a balancing impulse appears to defy the conventional Neo-realist predictions of state behaviour and to continue to fulfil its characterization as a ‘structural anomaly’.[7](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-7) In the absence of a compelling Neo-realist analysis, in recent years much explanation of Japan’s international relations has lapsed into Constructivist perspectives, which stress the primacy of deep-rooted domestic anti-militaristic norms and principles over international structural pressures.[8](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-8) For the Constructivist take on Japan, therefore, the emphasis has been on continuity and stasis in Japan’s international strategy, to the point where its security policy is claimed as akin to an ‘immovable object’.[9](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-9) Meanwhile, although Neo-liberal Institutionalism has been more marginal as a distinct perspective applied to Japan, especially given the dominance of Constructivism and its ‘positive’ norms of anti-militarism that offer crossover with key tenets of Liberalism-type outcomes, it too has emphasized continuity in Japanese international strategy, or ‘Cautious Liberalism’, marked again by a lack of impulse to pursue balancing.[10](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-10) In the midst of this Constructivist stranglehold on the study of Japan’s international and security orientation, the best traction Neo-realism and its variants has been able to gain on the debate has been to introduce explanations that essentially corroborate the consensus on Japan’s lack of propensity to diverge from its post-war security stance and to avoid active balancing. Japan has been evaluated as pursuing various ‘Realist’-oriented strategies to respond to China’s rise, such as a Japanese-specific variant of ‘Defensive Realism’, which sees Japan concentrating on ‘homeland defence’ through the acquisition of ‘defensive’ weaponry and the eschewing of broader international security objectives outside its own territory that would involve influencing the balance of power.[11](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-11) Japan has also been categorized as pursuing a ‘buck-passing’ strategy and essentially passive reliance on the USA to cope with China’s rise.[12](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-12) More prevalently, Japan has been perceived as moving towards a strategy of ‘Reluctant Realism’, with a gradualistic propensity to work with its US ally to meet common security challenges.[13](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-13) ‘Reluctant Realism’ is the view that perhaps edges closest to suggesting that Japan might cautiously consider balancing China, but in all these variants of Neo-realism/Realism, Japan is regarded as largely passive in responding to China’s rise, and likely to balance solely via the mechanism of the US–Japan alliance and never individually. In fact, most Neo-realist/Realist views settle on the argument that at the very most Japan is set to hedge rather than balance against China’s rise, or in one important formulation to practice ‘cooperative engagement with a soft hedge’.[14](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-14) The somewhat curious implicit consensus among the supposedly contending perspectives of Neo-realism, Constructivism, and Liberalism that Japan has been, continues to be, and will likely remain, highly restrained in responding to China’s rise might seem to render redundant any further discussion of a possibly more radical Japanese reaction, including the impulse to balance more actively. Japan’s ‘Yoshida Doctrine’—classically formulated as a concentration on economic engagement, an ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ security posture, and reliance on the shield of US hegemony—would appear to be a highly entrenched grand strategy for Japanese policymakers.[15](http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/109.full#fn-15)

#### *Prior, binding* consultation’s key to the alliance, the collapse of which risks shreds global nonproliferation norms, risks Japan rearm, and sparks nuclear escalation across Asia

Santoro & Warden ‘15

[David – Senior Fellow at the CSIS’ Pacific Forum. And John – Fellow at the CSIS’ Pacific Forum. “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 38 N. 1. 2015. ln]

Dubbed the second nuclear age, 2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms - control and crisis - management mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured. 3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history. 4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially - strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long - range missile programs. 5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear - armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision - making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major - power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing. 6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety - five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.” 7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.” 8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear - armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long - range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward - deployed in Asia. 9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a far - fetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor. 10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons. 11 Initial Steps to Assure Japan and South Korea The United States has a variety of military and political tools at its disposal to assure Japan and South Korea. Because the requirements of assurance and extended deterrence overlap, actions designed to strengthen extended deterrence, such as modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and public declarations of will, also strengthen assurance as long as their effects are relayed to allies. Yet, these steps will not be sufficient. Assurance has to be tailored to the needs of each ally and include dialogue, consultations, joint planning, and improved relations beyond the military area. The Obama administration has reassured Japan and South Korea by committing to strengthen extended deterrence including extended nuclear deterrence. In nuclear policy, President Barack Obama is perhaps best known for his commitment to the long - term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which resulted in him receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 and set the tone for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. Yet, just as important is the work that his administration has done to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Washington reiterated that the United States must deploy strong and credible military forces tailored to regional needs. 12 Washington continues to ascribe an important role to nuclear weapons in extended deterrence. The Obama administration stated that U.S. nuclear weapons continue to deter non - nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies, rejecting the notion that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use. In its revised nuclear employment strategy, it reiterated that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and our allies and partners.” 13 The administration confirmed the U.S. reliance on central strategic forces to deter threats in Northeast Asia; committed to modernizing its triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine - launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear - capable bombers; and decided to maintain a capability to forward deploy nuclear - capable fighter - bombers. Bombers and fighter - bombers give the United States the ability to visibly show resolve to an adversary and assure an ally, as was the case in March 2013 when U.S. bombers flew through South Korean air space following North Korean belligerence. 14 At the same time, the NPR committed to reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons, in part by emphasizing the important and growing role of non - nuclear capabilities. 15 Because allies face a broad range of threats, many below the level of full - scale war, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation may not always be credible. Conventional strike capabilities, by contrast, are generally perceived as more usable. The administration also highlighted the important role that missile defense plays in extended deterrence by complicating an adversary’s strategic calculus. While generally supportive of the Obama administration’s dual commitment to move toward a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, some in Tokyo and Seoul were concerned that the United States might move away from the nuclear option too soon or too fast. 16 The administration, however, was able to allay these fears through frequent consultations during the NPR process, which shaped allied perceptions before new policies were finalized. 17 Without the prior consultations, the United States likely would have faced an assurance crisis. Consultations provided the United States an opportunity to demonstrate to allies that nuclear weapons would continue to remain an important part of extended deterrence. Washington explained how its nuclear forces would contribute to allied defense and avoided policy changes that would have unnecessarily increased allied anxiety. The United States, for example, talked through the decision to retire the nuclear variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile and convinced its allies—Japan in particular—that the combination of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the ability to forward deploy fighter - bombers in the future was sufficient for extended deterrence. 18 The United States also avoided further narrowing its nuclear declaratory policy—opting to retain calculated ambiguity rather than adopting a sole purpose formulation—in part because of the concerns of allies. 19 The NPR concluded that regular extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea were needed. The United States has long held formal discussions about nuclear policy with its European allies under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but there had been no such process in Northeast Asia. Rather, consultations took place in an ad hoc manner, leaving allies mostly on the receiving end of U.S. decisions. Therefore, the Obama administration worked with Tokyo to establish the U.S.– Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) in 2010 and co - founded with Seoul the U.S.–South Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) that same year. These forums, which build on years of unofficial discussions among experts and officials from the respective countries, 20 have institutionalized high - Level focus on ways to strengthen deterrence in Northeast Asia. This has enhanced assurance by helping Tokyo and Seoul better understand U.S. policies and capabilities, and giving them a greater sense of enfranchisement in matters involving their security. Finally, the Obama administration recognized that effective assurance goes beyond capabilities and deterrence - focused discussions. At root, assurance is a function of the nature of the relationship between the United States and its ally. Analyst Michael Wheeler explains that, “Security relationships are first and foremost political relationships...if the basic political relationship is strong, security relationships can better weather short - term challenges.” 21 For this reason, the Obama administration has worked to deepen political engagement with Japan and South Korea. Beginning in 2011, it announced that the United States would ‘rebalance’ the focus of its foreign policy to the Asia–Pacific, increasing diplomatic, economic, and military engagement in the region. 22 As part of the rebalance, the United States concluded the U.S.–ROK free - trade agreement (known as KORUS), rejuvenated efforts to negotiate and implement the Trans - Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would include Japan, and emphasized the important contributions that its allies make to regional security. Together, these initiatives served to solidify the U.S. political relationship with Japan and South Korea respectively, assuring them that the United States has an enduring interest in their partnerships.

#### That incentivizes broader Asian prolif and causes nuclear war

Tan ‘15

[Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales. Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31]

East Asia’s arms race leads the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained. Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In additions, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong as intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

### 1nc condition on human rights cp

The United States federal government should condition \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ on tangible improvements on human rights in the People’s Republic of China.

#### Unconditional engagement triggers human rights violations---explicit conditions solve---even if China doesn’t say yes, pressure creates political space needed for dissident gains

Roth 11 - executive director at the Human Rights Watch, served as a federal prosecutor in New York and for the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington, DC, graduate of Yale Law School and Brown University, has conducted numerous human rights investigations and missions around the world, has written extensively on a wide range of human rights abuses, devoting special attention to issues of international justice, counterterrorism, the foreign policies of the major powers, and the work of the United Nations (Kenneth, “World Report 2011: A Facade of Action,” http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/world-report-2011-facade-action)//BB

There is often a degree of rationality in a government's decision to violate human rights. The government might fear that permitting greater freedom would encourage people to join together in voicing discontent and thus jeopardize its grip on power. Or abusive leaders might worry that devoting resources to the impoverished would compromise their ability to enrich themselves and their cronies. International pressure can change that calculus. Whether exposing or condemning abuses, conditioning access to military aid or budgetary support on ending them, imposing targeted sanctions on individual abusers, or even calling for prosecution and punishment of those responsible, public pressure raises the cost of violating human rights. It discourages further oppression, signaling that violations cannot continue cost-free. All governments have a duty to exert such pressure. A commitment to human rights requires not only upholding them at home but also using available and appropriate tools to convince other governments to respect them as well. No repressive government likes facing such pressure. Today many are fighting back, hoping to dissuade others from adopting or continuing such measures. That reaction is hardly surprising. What is disappointing is the number of governments that, in the face of that reaction, are abandoning public pressure. With disturbing frequency, governments that might have been counted on to generate such pressure for human rights are accepting the rationalizations and subterfuges of repressive governments and giving up. In place of a commitment to exerting public pressure for human rights, they profess a preference for softer approaches such as private "dialogue" and "cooperation." There is nothing inherently wrong with dialogue and cooperation to promote human rights. Persuading a government through dialogue to genuinely cooperate with efforts to improve its human rights record is a key goal of human rights advocacy. A cooperative approach makes sense for a government that demonstrably wants to respect human rights but lacks the resources or technical know-how to implement its commitment. It can also be useful for face-saving reasons-if a government is willing to end violations but wants to appear to act on its own initiative. Indeed, Human Rights Watch often engages quietly with governments for such reasons. But when the problem is a lack of political will to respect rights, public pressure is needed to change the cost-benefit analysis that leads to the choice of repression over rights. In such cases, the quest for dialogue and cooperation becomes a charade designed more to appease critics of complacency than to secure change, a calculated diversion from the fact that nothing of consequence is being done. Moreover, the refusal to use pressure makes dialogue and cooperation less effective because governments know there is nothing to fear from simply feigning serious participation. Recent illustrations of this misguided approach include ASEAN's tepid response to Burmese repression, the United Nations' deferential attitude toward Sri Lankan atrocities, the European Union's obsequious approach to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the soft Western reaction to certain favored repressive African leaders such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, the weak United States policy toward Saudi Arabia, India's pliant posture toward Burma and Sri Lanka, and the near-universal cowardice in confronting China's deepening crackdown on basic liberties. In all of these cases, governments, by abandoning public pressure, effectively close their eyes to repression. Even those that shy away from using pressure in most cases are sometimes willing to apply it toward pariah governments, such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, whose behavior, whether on human rights or other matters, is so outrageous that it overshadows other interests. But in too many cases, governments these days are disappointingly disinclined to use public pressure to alter the calculus of repression. When governments stop exerting public pressure to address human rights violations, they leave domestic advocates-rights activists, sympathetic parliamentarians, concerned journalists-without crucial support. Pressure from abroad can help create the political space for local actors to push their government to respect rights. It also can let domestic advocates know that they are not alone, that others stand with them. But when there is little or no such pressure, repressive governments have a freer hand to restrict domestic advocates, as has occurred in recent years in Russia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And because dialogue and cooperation look too much like acquiescence and acceptance, domestic advocates sense indifference rather than solidarity.

#### Chinese respect for human rights is modeled globally---solves conflict and democratic peace

Schulz 9 - Senior Fellow in human rights policy at the Center for American Progress, served as Executive Director of Amnesty International USA from 1994 to 2006 (William F., January 2009, Strategic Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China, Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/china\_human\_rights.pdf)//BB

The decision to de-link human rights and trade, made early in the Clinton administration, removed one vehicle for exerting pressure on China—albeit a vehicle that had yielded limited results—without offering up an alternative. The Bush administration further softened policy on China’s human rights record, subordinating the issue to economic priorities and strategic concerns about North Korea. Though it maintained pressure on China to improve its record on religious rights in the country, the Bush administration chose, ironically enough, to drop China from the State Department’s list of worst human rights violators three days before China’s crackdown on Tibet in March 2008. Yet the state of human rights in China is critically important both in terms of international human rights norms and American interests. To be sure, there are no mass killings going on in China, as there are in Darfur, and while Beijing is highly repressive, its authoritarian leaders are more open to outside influence than the generals who rule in Myanmar. But measured by the sheer numbers of people being affected by abuse of their rights, China may be the premier violator of civil and political rights in the world. Furthermore, because of China’s very size and reach, its posture toward human rights has a profound influence on how human rights norms and practices are perceived at the United Nations, in developing countries where China is expanding its engagement at a rapid rate,10 and throughout Asia. Human rights standards (and the legal regimens that codify them) have evolved over the last two centuries; what had been accepted as normative, such as slavery, is regarded today as abhorrent and a violation of international law. But those standards can devolve as well, especially if powerful nations seek regressive changes or instigate regressive norms—casting the entire human rights regimen into jeopardy. Conversely, significant improvement in China’s human rights policies would reverberate widely around the world, removing a model of authoritarianism for others to mimic or hide behind. Improving China’s human rights record will pay enormous dividends for the United States as well. Americans have been far too easily swayed by the notion that China’s economic advances have by necessity come at the expense of a sacrifice of civil and political rights. Businesses especially have been persuaded that economic growth will be sufficient to usher in political change…eventually.11 And many Americans are wary of the security issues implicated in competition with China, asking whether we should alienate such an important emerging power over issues like democracy or religious freedom. But states that allow themselves to be held to account by their own citizens and respect the rule of law tend to be more reliable partners in their relations with other states. Any authoritarian country is inherently brittle, caught up in needless preoccupation with controlling its own population and warding off dissent. That makes for suspicion and resentment of outsiders. The absence of a viable opposition or fully independent press makes a ruling party less wary of abrogating international agreements or alienating other nations for no good reason. A fickle approach to the rule of law jeopardizes everything from business contracts for American corporations to enforcement of trade and environmental agreements. Cheap Chinese labor undercuts American jobs; the higher the labor standards in a country, the slower the U.S. trade deficit grows.12 Moreover, if we accept the commonly agreed proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, launch wars against other democracies, then a more democratic China is likely to be a less belligerent China—at least in the long run. Finally, were China to place a higher value on human rights, it might well be willing to bear a greater portion of the burden for such things as U.N. human rights mechanisms and the resolution of international crises stemming from injustice.

#### Independent of compliance, leveraging engagement for rights solves US human rights leadership

Lagon 15 – PhD @ Georgetown, Global Politics and Security Chair at the Master of Science in Foreign Service (Mark, “U.S. Interests in Human Rights: Leveraging Prudent Policy Tools,” https://freedomhouse.org/article/us-interests-human-rights-leveraging-prudent-policy-tools)//BB

As President of Freedom House, I often hear objections that a multitude of human rights challenges globally are too ingrained for the United States to successfully affect or that there are already so many problems here at home we shouldn’t bother with the many challenges overseas. These arguments are short-sighted and ill-founded.

Decisive U.S. global leadership is still needed both to serve as a beacon for human dignity and freedom and to advance our interests. Especially given globalization, our strategic and economic interests are inextricably linked with the protection and promotion of human rights.

Let’s take two of the toughest cases. It is estimated that $300 billion is lost per year in intellectual property theft, and China accounts for 70 percent of that loss. [1] If Chinese authorities respected rule of law, nowhere near this level of IP theft, including from U.S. headquartered multinational corporations, would occur. Human rights has a direct bearing on U.S. security interests, too. In Egypt, terrorist attacks have soared since General al-Sisi took power, and he has instituted arguably the harshest crackdown in modern Egyptian history.[2] Activists have been arbitrarily arrested, independent groups are being harrassed and shut down, and dozens have disappeared over the last several months.[3] That is while the U.S. continues to give massive military assistance to that regime.

My second message is to encourage putting inexpensive, high-leverage, targeted tools in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox to advance those interests in human rights. There are tools that maximize U.S. leverage, will not cost the American taxpayer much, and avoid harm to innocent people and enterprises in the U.S. and globally. I’ll touch on ones the Chairman and Ranking Member have been advocating.

Modern Slavery

In some countries, our foreign policy challenge is pushing governments to protect their most vulnerable populations. According to a conservative International Labor Organization estimate, human trafficking – aptly referred to as modern day slavery – victimizes some 21 million men, women, and children around the world through sexual and labor exploitation. While labor trafficking victimizes more people, sex trafficking yields more profits to the traffickers on the backs of its victims. Trafficking preys on the powerless and depends on corruption and weak rule of law in order to thrive.

But it is not only human dignity and freedom that suffer from the impacts of trafficking. Businesses and economies are impacted, as well. Businesses’ value, productivity, and reputation suffer where gross exploitation of marginalized populations arise, so often facilitated by corruption. Economic growth, prosperity, entrepreneurship, and poverty alleviation benefit greatly from transparency, rule of law, predictability, and formal economic activity. Conversely, human trafficking is based on all the antitheses of these factors – not only dehumanizing its victims but undercutting the mutual interests of the U.S. and other nations in thriving markets grounded in access to justice for all.

Freedom House supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the recent legislation to facilitate such trade deals. Senators Menendez and Cardin, among others, asked whether Tier 3 countries in the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report would be let into TPP. The Executive Branch must not send forward candidates for TPP who are in the lowest ranking in the TIP Report, about which it has given assurances to the Congress. In particular, Malaysia is a very problematic case with intermingled issues of corruption and lack of protections for marginalized and migrant populations, and should not be let off the hook of the intended “minimum standards” set out in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

Freedom House has emphatically endorsed Chairman Corker’s End Modern Slavery Initiative Act (S. 553), which creates a grant-making foundation to address global trafficking and is funded by leveraging taxpayer resources with those of other nations, corporation, and philanthropic foundations. If passed, this legislation will take a bold step forward in the fight against modern slavery and will enable U.S. foreign policy to more effectively pressure governments to protect their most vulnerable populations. It is exactly the kind of prudent, canny foreign policy tool we need, an idea I will return to.

Authoritarianism and Corruption

Authoritarianism and the corruption that usually goes hand-in-hand with it also pose major challenges for human rights. Some erroneously believe authoritarian rule brings stability. In fact, the opposite is true. Repression breeds discontent, and a lack of democratic governance can create an enabling environment for terrorism. Freedom House analysis highlights how 90 percent of terrorist attacks and 98 percent of terrorism fatalities occur in Not Free and Partly Free countries, as opposed to Free democracies.[4] Moreover, corruption often fuels human rights abuses, because corrupt officials will go to ever-greater lengths to hold onto power lest they lose their access to state resources. In addition to its well-known reports, much of what Freedom House does is civil-society capacity building partnerships. One important area of programming prepares journalists to uncover corruption and criminality, and withstand threats of violence, as Freedom House programs have done in Ukraine, Moldova, and Mexico. And I know corruption in Moldova. In 2008, as anti-trafficking ambassador, the office I directed saw and called out in the TIP Report how the head of a U.S.-funded anti-trafficking interagency office in Moldova was complicit in trafficking. A Tier 3 ranking lit a fire under its leaders to clean up the problem. Freedom House research indicates Moldova still has a long way to go in fighting corruption and strengthening democratic governance.[5]

The 2015 Freedom in the World report has two overarching findings. First, Freedom House found a troubling increase in the use of aggressive tactics by authoritarian regimes worldwide and saw worrying backsliding in accountable governance of nations of regional and economic importance: Venezuela, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, Kenya, and Hungary. Our 2015 report found a more explicit rejection of democratic standards than previous years. Earlier, autocrats acknowledged international agreements and attempted to veil their undemocratic actions with quasi-democratic language—holding elections that were free but not fair, for example. Today, authoritarian rulers are turning to more aggressively anti-democratic behavior and harsher, more “traditional” tactics in places like Egypt, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Vietnam; Azerbaijan’s crackdown on human rights defenders; and Russia’s invasion of Crimea.

Second, the relationship of human rights to terrorism is crucial to an enlightened understanding of U.S. strategic interests. Again, repression amplifies the discontent fueling terrorism. And our annual report found a marked increase in authoritarian regimes using “counterterrorism” as an excuse to crack down on non-violent dissent and repress minorities. In China, terrorism is invoked as an excuse to repress the Uighur ethnic minority, jailing anyone expressing dissent and bringing ethnically Han Chinese to populate Xinjiang. A newly-passed “national security law” broadened the definition of what constitutes a threat to national security and has been used – as the State Department noted – “as a legal façade to commit human rights abuses.”[6] Over the last week, more than one hundred lawyers, activists and other peaceful human rights defenders have been detained.[7] So, too, even in strengthening a coalition of partners to fight ISIS as itself a threat to human rights, the U.S. government should take care not to give such partners – like Bahrain and its big sibling Saudi Arabia – a pass to crack down on peaceful opposition and civil society. I wear a Freedom House wristband (purple like the Not Free nations on our Freedom in the World map) to recall Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, a journalist jailed in Bahrain since 2011 in just such an overreach by an autocratic “partner.”

Let me focus on cases Assistant Secretary Malinowski raised at the release of the annual Human Rights Report. In dealings with Iran, the United States should address the serious human rights concerns with at least the same energy as it did in negotiating a nuclear accord. The talks with Iran unfortunately coincided with a de-prioritization and de-linking of human rights from the global agenda, when they instead should have advanced the concerns that the Iranian people and the world share about the regime’s repression. Earlier this week, in spontaneous gatherings after the announcement of an agreement, Iranians reminded us of what those priorities were. They publicly chanted for the release of opposition leaders and declared that their next agreement should secure their civil rights. We must raise the cases of Americans detained in Iran and seek tangible progress on human rights and rule of law issues, including the hundreds of political prisoners, Iran’s staggeringly high execution rate, its repressive media and online environment, and its subjugation of women and religious minorities.

In negotiations with Cuba, the United States must ensure that actual progress is made in moving the ball forward on human rights, civic space, and free elections. As in Iran, the yardstick of success for U.S.-Cuba policy is not merely the diplomacy in and of itself —it is whether we use diplomatic relations to promote meaningful reforms and reduce cruel repression in Cuba. The United States’ decision to continue full speed ahead with the restoration of diplomatic relations – despite last week’s detention of more than 100 peaceful activists in Cuba[8] – sends troublingly mixed messages about the importance of human rights and civil society for U.S. foreign policy.

Diplomatic engagement, when leveraged rather than seen an end in itself, can serve as an important and powerful tool in our foreign policy tool box to address human rights. But, as the United States Senate well knows, there are times at which new tools are needed.

#### That’s key to global democracy

Abrams 16 – MA in IR @ LSE, JD @ Harvard, former American diplomat, lawyer and political scientist who served in foreign policy positions, first author of a letter signed by 139 signers, who are Democrats and Repubicans and have served in numerous administrations, include one name that stands out and must be noted: former Secretary of State George P. Shultz (Elliott, “Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy,” CFR, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2016/03/16/democracy-and-u-s-foreign-policy/)//BB

Some argue that we can pursue either our democratic ideals or our national security, but not both. This is a false choice. We recognize that we have other interests in the economic, energy, and security realms with other countries and that democracy and human rights cannot be the only items on the foreign policy agenda. But all too often, these issues get shortchanged or dropped entirely in order to smooth bilateral relationships in the short run. The instability that has characterized the Middle East for decades is the direct result of generations of authoritarian repression, the lack of accountable government, and the repression of civil society, not the demands that we witnessed during the Arab Spring of 2011 and since for dignity and respect for basic human rights. In the longer run, we pay the price in instability and conflict when corrupt, autocratic regimes collapse.

Our request is that you elevate democracy and human rights to a prominent place on your foreign policy agenda. These are challenging times for freedom in many respects, as countries struggle to make democracy work and powerful autocracies brutalize their own citizens while undermining their neighbors. But these autocracies are also vulnerable. Around the world, ordinary people continue to show their preference for participatory democracy and accountable government. Thus, there is real potential to renew global democratic progress.

For that to happen, the United States must exercise leadership, in league with our democratic allies, to support homegrown efforts to make societies freer and governments more democratic. We ask you to commit to providing that leadership and to embracing the cause of democracy and human rights if elected president of the United States.

#### Democracy solves existential threats

Peiser 7 – social anthropologist @ Liverpool (Existential Risk and Democratic Peace, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm>)

In recent years, humankind has become aware of a number of global and existential risks that potentially threaten our survival. These natural and man-made risks comprise cosmic disasters, volcanic super-eruptions and climatic disruption on the one hand, and nuclear warfare, technological catastrophes and fully-fledged bioterrorism on the other. In order to secure the future of civilisation, we are challenged to recognise and ward off these low-probability, but potentially destructive hazards. A new debate is gaining momentum about how best to achieve a secure future for our planetary civilisation. The rise of neo-catastrophism The perception that disorder rather than harmony held sway in the solar system gradually began to emerge during the 20th Century. The traditional concept of an essentially benign universe was replaced by that of an unpredictable cosmos punctuated by global catastrophes. The emergence of scientific neo-catastrophism surfaced as a corollary of the space age. Artist's impression of asteroid impact. Image: AFP/Getty There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm Images of impact craters sent back by space missions in the 1960s and 1970s exposed the pock-marked, impact-covered surface of many planets. At the same time, the identification of hyper-velocity impact craters on the Earth and empirical evidence of half a dozen mass extinction events generated a new view of our planet as a fundamentally hazardous and catastrophic place in space. More recently, predictions of large-scale disasters and societal upheaval as a result of catastrophic climate change, as well as growing apprehension about impending bioterrorism and nuclear warfare, have become almost routine issues of international concern. There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm. The existential risk paradox At the core of today's collective anxieties lies what I call the existential risk paradox. As advances in science, medical research, genetics and technology are accelerating, human vulnerability to global hazards such as cosmic impacts, natural disasters, famine and pandemics has significantly decreased. Simultaneously, the proliferation of democratic liberalism and free market economies around the world has **dramatically curtailed** the death toll associated with natural disasters and diseases. A recent study confirms that the annual percentage of people killed by natural disasters has decreased tenfold in the last 40 years, in spite of the fact that the average annual number of recorded disasters increased fivefold. Evidently, open and technological societies are becoming **increasingly resilient** to the effects of natural disasters. Kari Marie Norgaard Read a view of the psychology of climate scepticism from US scholar Kari Norgaard Inside the climate ostrich Yet the very same technologies that are serving us to analyse, predict and prevent potential disasters have reached such a level of sophistication and potency that their misuse can transform vital survival tools into destructive forces, thus becoming existential risks in their own right. The nuclear device that may protect us from a devastating asteroid impact can also be employed for belligerent purposes. Genetic engineering that offers the prospect of infinite food supplies for the world's growing population can be turned into weapons of bioterrorism. And without the global utilisation of fossil fuels we would lack all trappings of modern civilisation and social progress. Yet, fossil fuels are regarded as dangerous resources that are widely blamed for economic tensions, wars and catastrophic climate change. Existential risk perception There seems to be some correlation between media exposure and existential risk perception. The more people see, hear or read about the risks of Near Earth Object (NEO) impacts, nuclear terrorism or global climate catastrophes, the more concerned they have become. The mere mention of catastrophic risks, regardless of its low probability, is enough to make the danger more urgent, thus increasing public estimates of danger. Scientists who evaluate risks are often torn between employing level-headed risk communication and the temptation to overstate potential danger. Sunbather (BBC) Media called on 'climate porn' Chaotic world of climate truth The inclination to amplify a possible risk is only too understandable. Personal biases, as well as grants and funding pressures, are considerable motivating factors to hype a probable hazard; ;n many cases, funding is allocated on the basis of intense lobbying. This, in turn, can tempt researchers to aggressively promote their specific "danger warning" via the mass media. Behind many alarms lurk vested interests of research institutions, campaign groups, political parties, charities, businesses or the news media, all of whom vie for attention, influence and funding in a relentless war of words. Professional risk analysts disapprove of such scare tactics, and point out that the detrimental affects of apocalyptic-sounding alarms and the rise of collective anxieties are much costlier than generally presumed. Whether individuals regard existential risks as a serious and pressing threat, or a remote and long-term risk, often depends on their psychological traits. Nobody has appreciated this conundrum perhaps better than Sir Winston Churchill who famously said: "An optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity." Doomsday argument In recent years, leading scientists in the UK, such as Brandon Carter, Stephen Hawking and Sir Martin Rees, have advanced the so-called Doomsday Argument, a cosmological theory in which global catastrophes due to low-probability mega-disasters play a considerable role. This speculative theory maintains that scientific risk assessments have systematically underestimated existential hazards. Hence the probability is growing that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom, are wrong Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined or unavoidable. According to a more optimistic view of the future, all existential risks can be tackled, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. From this confident perspective of emergent risk reduction, the resilience of civilisation is no longer restricted by the constraints of human biology. Instead, it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and information-crunching technologies that potentially comprise boundless technological solutions to existential risks. Current advances in developing an effective planetary defence system, for example, will eventually lead to a protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts. The societal response to the cosmic impact hazard is a prime example of how technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk from the list of contemporary concerns. A technology-based response to climate change impacts is equally feasible, and equally capable of solving the problem. Global democracy as a solution But while most natural extinction risks can be entirely eliminated by technological fixes, no such clean-cut solutions are available for the **inherent** potential **threats** posed by **super-technologies.** After all, the principal threat to our long-term survival is the destabilising and destructive violence committed by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes. Here, **the solution can only be political and cultural**. Enola Gay. Image: Getty Effective democracy may prevent man-made catastrophes Fortunately, there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of **democratic liberalism** is directly correlated with a steep reduction of **armed conflicts.** A recent UN report found that the total number of wars and civil conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War, while the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically, from 37,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. According to the field of democratic peace research, the growing number of democracies is the foremost reason for the pacification of many international conflicts. Democracies have never gone to war against each other, as democratic states adopt compromise solutions to both internal and external problems. As Rudolph J Rummel, one of the world's most eminent peace researchers, has stated: "In democracy we have **a cure for war** and a way of minimising political violence, genocide, and mass murder." On balance, therefore, I believe that the prophets of doom, including those predicting climate doom, are wrong. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that we can avoid major mayhem and disruption during our risky transition to become a hyper-technological, type 1 civilisation. Even so, societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher than at any hitherto stage of history.

### 1nc broader cooperation vs Grand Bargain CP

The United States federal government should offer to increase joint military exercises, joint participation in humanitarian missions, and naval cooperation in counter-piracy with the People’s Republic of China, as well as expand student exchanges, promote a binding code of conduct at sea, expand defense cooperation with regional allies, and joint the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

#### CP solves the case better than the plan

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Glaser’s article offers a false choice: U.S. foreign policy need not decide between accommodation and military competition. Rather it should continue to be defined by extensive economic and diplomatic engagement, coupled with meaningful military hedging. Glaser is correct that Washington and Beijing lack trust in each other, but rather than justifying a grand bargain, this strongly suggests that such a bargain would not work. To enhance trust and reassurance, there are more prudent options such as agreements for mutual observation of military exercises, joint participation in humanitarian missions, and further naval cooperation in counter-piracy operations.28 Achieving “win-win” relations calls for further Chinese integration into the international normative framework to which Taiwan is already committed, including peaceful resolution of disputes, economic exchange according to international legal standards, and respect for human rights.

The United States should redouble its efforts at normative convergence. While U.S.-China trade and political engagement are robust, social ties are woefully asymmetric. Washington needs to better encourage American students to study Asia, while persuading Beijing to lower barriers to American companies and nongovernmental organizations. U.S. policy should do more with China’s neighbors, not to contain or encircle China, but to forge a common message at regional forums; advance a binding code of conduct at sea; and meet commitments to global governance, such as quota reform for the International Monetary Fund, full funding of defense cooperation initiatives, and implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If the United States strengthens its promotion of international norms—including peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations that respect Taiwan’s democracy—American interests and regional stability are much more likely to be secured than by betting on a U.S.-China grand bargain.

### 1nc Coast Guard exchanges CP

#### Coast Guard exchanges Solves South China Sea Escalation-Key to assure allies and prevents Civilian military conflict escalation

Picozzi & Davidson 16-\*the research associate for the military & \*\* a research associate for Asia Studies at the council on Foreign Reations(\*Aaron & \*\*Lincoln, “Responding to Coast Guard Expansion in the South China Sea”, June 9, 2016, Council on Foreign Relations, [http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2016/06/09/responding-to-coast-guard-expansion-in-the-south-china-sea/)//SL](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2016/06/09/responding-to-coast-guard-expansion-in-the-south-china-sea/)/SL)

South China Sea claimants are awaiting a decision by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in an arbitration case on the legality of the Chinese government’s claims. But regardless of how the UN tribunal decides, South China Sea disputes won’t go away anytime soon. Military activity in the South China Sea is expanding, increasing the risk of “dangerous brinksmanship” over the islands and reefs scattered throughout the region. While the United States Navy has taken the lead in responding to regional military activity, we believe that coast guard-coast guard exchanges can reduce the risk of conflict, while still assuring regional partners of American dedication in the South China Sea.

Over the last year, China has conducted dredging activities at an unprecedented scale, using the newly-built islands to base missile systems and military aircraft. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has conducted substantial drills in the region. India has considered joint patrols with the United States in the South China Sea, and the Philippines and Vietnam have considered similar cooperation. Just last week, the French defense minister called on European countries to have a “regular and visible” presence in the region to maintain freedom of navigation.

The United States has also long been active in the South China Sea, conducting known freedom of navigation operations near Chinese-controlled features in October 2015 and in January and May 2016. In April, the U.S. Air Force stationed four A-10 Warthogs—which carry one of the most powerful aircraft guns ever built—in the Philippines, sending a clear signal to China that the United States is prepared to deal with military conflict in the South China Sea.

The U.S. military has increased the presence and visibility of aircraft and naval vessels to assure regional partners that the United States remains committed to their security, going tit-for-tat with the Chinese military in force escalation. Recent expansion of the Chinese Coast Guard marks a pivot point for America’s posturing, however. Chinese Coast Guard cutters—although lacking sufficient armament to challenge a U.S. Navy vessel in direct combat—are capable of meaningfully affecting the situation in the South China Sea. Lots of ink has been spilled about how China’s reclamation activities “change facts on the ground,” but Chinese Coast Guard activities do at least as much to alter the reality in the South China Sea. When the Chinese Coast Guard threatens or actually uses force to enforce Chinese law within areas that Zhongnanhai claims are their waters, they are effecting functional control of the region.

The islands claimed by the countries surrounding the South China Sea have little intrinsic value—their value hinges upon the effective assertion of sovereignty and subsequent control over surrounding waters. With approximately $5 trillion worth of international trade passing through the region annually, an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas located under the region, and nearly 10 million tons of fish caught in the South China Sea each year, the control of these waters is extremely important to regional economies.

Coast guard cutters enable governments to enforce law and assert sovereignty claims without the overt presence of a warship. This ability to maintain control over an area, without fear of an impending attack, offers an entirely different set of tactics compared to the involvement of a naval vessel. Cutters and the embarkable boarding parties they carry can effectively control merchant vessels within their jurisdiction.

China is not the only South China Sea claimant expanding its coast guard activities. In March, an Indonesian Coast Guard vessel apprehended a Chinese fishing vessel illegally fishing in Indonesian waters. The Chinese Coast Guard responded by ramming the apprehended vessel, freeing it from Indonesian control. Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia have all expanded their coast guards in recent years, and the United States has committed to selling more cutters to partners in the region.

Continuing the United States’ current tactic of mirroring Chinese show of force in the South China Sea by deploying Coast Guard assets to the region would be a mistake.

Conducting law enforcement activities in certain parts of the South China Sea on behalf of regional allies and partners would involve a recognition of those countries’ territorial claims, something the United States government has been unwilling to do. And while interactions between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy are tense, they exist within a set of predictable, well-defined rules that govern the way the navies of different countries handle encounters.

Interactions between military vessels and civilians, on the other hand, are inherently volatile, as civilian ships are not as well trained and regimented as naval vessels—nor are they governed by the same established procedures or subject to as robust government oversight. As Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command, recently pointed out, it is highly unlikely that an interaction between military vessels sparks a conflict in the South China Sea. Civilian vessels, however, are another story. “My worst maritime experiences have been with fishing boats,” Montgomery said. “The highest risk is associated with non-military vessels.” Compounding this risk, any action taken by the U.S. Coast Guard towards Chinese civilians would be a propaganda victory for the Chinese government, cementing their claims of American aggression.

The United States is not left without options. By training and equipping the coast guards of our regional partners, the United States can help them counter control of commerce in the South China Sea by the growing Chinese Coast Guard. The United States has worked alongside Pacific partners in a number of exercises in the past, including coast guard training with the Philippines in 2015, the U.S. Navy training operation Exercise Balikatan in 2016, and the training of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force for expeditionary warfare. While in Vietnam last month, President Obama acknowledged the importance of the Vietnamese Coast Guard, stating that the United States would continue to train them in maritime law enforcement in order to improve capabilities in the South China Sea.

These trainings are designed as responses to specific Chinese actions. For example, during this year’s Exercise Balikatan, the United States, Australia, and the Philippines conducted “a simulated gas and oil platform recovery raid in the South China Sea”—a clear counter to China’s positioning of an oil platform in disputed waters south of the Spratly Islands in 2014. At the same time, by increasing the professionalism of the maritime law enforcement forces of claimants, trainings serve to mitigate the spectre of conflict in the South China Sea. By continuing to train and support the coast guards of regional partners, the United States will contribute to countering Chinese claims,while reassuring partners and allies of our dedication to our regional commitments—in a way that reduces potential conflict between U.S. forces and Chinese sailors and civilians.

### 1nc – deterrence in Taiwan CP

#### **CP: The United States Federal Government should cooperate with Taiwan to**

#### **-Pursue a free trade agreement** **which gives legislators sufficient oversight while forcing them to consider the nation’s interests as a whole.**

#### **-Raise Taiwan’s defense budget, increasing military modernization.**

#### **-Build an all-volunteer armed force with asymmetric deterrence capabilities as well as urban and rural guerilla-warfare capabilities.**

#### -increase anti-piracy cooperation

#### **-Reduce remaining technical barriers to trade, expand social exchange and encourage further bilateral cooperation on cyber security, disaster relief and other non-traditional security issues.**

#### **CP reassures necessary Taiwan relationship while avoiding Chinese military intervention**

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Revitalising Taiwan–US trade A first step in reassuring the United States could be to reduce Taiwan’s overreliance on the Chinese market, by revitalising Taiwan–US trade. Previous Taiwanese governments have consistently failed in their efforts to forge economic integration with major trade partners, due to Chinese obstructionism. Recognising this, the Ma administration has sought trade deals with the mainland first, hoping this will open Taiwan’s door to trade pacts with other countries. The signing of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010 has indeed enabled Taiwan to adopt free trade agreements (FTAs) with New Zealand and Singapore in 2013. The ECFA is predicted to increase Taiwan’s export dependence on the mainland, however, from 40%, the current rate, to 62% in 2020.25 Former US secretary of state Hillary Clinton thus warns of Taiwan’s growing vulnerability to the PRC’s economic leverage.

Taiwan therefore needs to rebalance its trade reliance by revitalising its economic relations with the United States, a long-time primary source of capital, know-how and markets. Although the US has long been the island’s largest source of foreign direct investment, Taiwan’s relative importance as a US trading partner is in gradual decline.27 A Taiwan–US free-trade agreement is the best way to demonstrate both parties’ commitment to their long-term economic relations. After lifting its recent ban on US beef, Taipei has resumed negotiating with Washington on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), the completion of which, however, will require Taiwan to implement previous promises and further remove barriers to American investment and agricultural products, despite the domestic repercussions. This will take political courage on the part of the Taiwanese government

Pursuing a free-trade agreement between Taiwan and the United States would not only symbolise their close ties, but would also help Taiwan enter into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the economic component of the United States’ rebalancing policy toward Asia. Although Taipei has voiced a desire to participate in TPP discussions, it has yet to sit at the table. To meet TPP’s high standards, Taiwan must reduce its protectionism. The difficulty in doing so is compounded by the pressure of electoral competition, people’s concern for their job security and officials’ inclination toward heavy regulation.

The Taiwanese government will need to lay out a road map for joining the TPP and pursuing a Taiwan–US FTA.29 An important way to build the necessary domestic support is to be more forthcoming about the political and security dividends that both endeavours will bring, in addition to calculations of economic winners and losers.

There are many things Taiwan can accomplish on its own, moreover, without relying on the political goodwill of other TPP members. Chief among these measures is deregulation: the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, in a 2014 paper, recognised Taiwan’s reforms in areas such as capital markets, intellectual property and tax as ‘a highly encouraging sign that Taiwan is serious about liberalizing its trade regime and embracing global practices’.30 Taiwan should also consider a trade-agreement ratification procedure similar to US ‘fast track’ authority, which gives legislators sufficient oversight while forcing them to consider the nation’s interests as a whole instead of their parochial incentives. Fast-track authority will increase trade partners’ confidence that Taiwan can deliver what it has promised.

Taiwan’s bid for entry into the TPP and a free-trade agreement with the United States serves as a driver of domestic economic liberalisation. Taiwan’s reluctance to open up its market has made it less attractive to foreign investment, which is crucial for economic growth. By engaging in difficult and unpopular domestic initiatives, such as deregulating to embrace more international competition, communicating with affected sectors and preparing for unavoidable adjustments, Taiwan will outwardly demonstrate its resolution to ensure an autonomous and prosperous economy.

Strengthening self-defence The improvement of cross-Strait relations does not entirely remove the possibility of war, particularly as the mainland continues its military build-up against the island.31 Neither the previous Democratic Progress Party regime nor the current Kuomintang administration, however, met the target of increasing defence spending to 3% of GDP.32 The island’s inability to defend itself has intensified American alarm.33 Taiwan’s constantly anaemic defence budget reflects not only the island’s excessive confidence that the US will come to the rescue, but also the public’s lack of confidence that any defence investment could meaningfully ward China off.

This mentality ignores the need for Taiwan to take measures for its own defence. The inconvenient truth is that Washington is unlikely to jump to Taiwan’s aid unless the costs are acceptable and Taipei could hold its ground until US troops arrive. Although Washington has thus far maintained close security ties with Taipei in terms of personnel training, intelligence sharing and military coordination, the relationship will continue to thrive only if Taiwan realises that it has to fight its own wars, rather than expecting the US to shed blood on its behalf. Given its unique situation, Taiwan must show a commitment to survival that surpasses that of other countries. In short, Taiwan’s optimal defence strategy is to raise the costs for a Chinese assault on the island and to increase the US incentive to intervene.

Raising the defence budget even at a time of reduced cross-Strait tensions would demonstrate Taiwan’s sincere intention to increase its capacity for selfdefence, but a more important task is to dispel pessimism about Taiwan’s ability to deter China.35 Taiwan should adopt the so-called ‘poisonous shrimp’ strategy – instead of aiming to defeat a Chinese invasion, this strategy makes the island too painful for China to swallow.36 Such a strategy introduces achievable objectives for Taiwan’s defence planning that are not premised on US intervention. It calls for doubling down on Taiwan’s military modernisation:37 building a lean, all-volunteer armed force with asymmetric deterrence capabilities,38 as well as urban and rural guerilla-warfare capabilities, in order to obstruct China’s hope of a quick and cheap fait accompli. Popular and military morale should be rallied around the goal of protecting Taiwan’s freedom of choice. Taiwan must understand that what is necessary to reassure the United States goes beyond mere budgetary numbers; rather, it means a viable strategy supported by the allocation of appropriate resources to carry it out.

Increasing self-defence capabilities is not only in Taiwan’s own best interest, it serves to meet American expectations. The decline in the US defence budget has made it imperative for Washington to stand shoulder to shoulder with those countries capable of preserving peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Taipei has shown itself to be a responsible ally through its restraint in maritime disputes, and a capable and responsible Taiwan is more likely to convince Washington to maintain its support.

### 1nc – deterrence in SCS CP

The United States should:

* Expand maritime transparency in the South China Sea
* Expand US Coast Guard patrols of the South China Sea
* Strengthen bilateral relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, including increasing defense cooperation
* Ensure regular carrier strike group patrols of, and build floating bases in, the South China Sea

#### Counterplan demonstrates military strength and contains China – appeasement allows advancements

Barno and Bensahel 6/14 Lt. General David W. Barno is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the School of International Service at American University (David and Nora, "A Guide to Stepping it Up in the South China Sea," War on the Rocks, 6/14/16, http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/a-guide-to-stepping-it-up-in-the-south-china-sea/)\\BPS

We suggest six options that the United States and its partners should now consider, listed in increasing order of assertiveness.

1. Enhance and expand maritime transparency in the South China Sea. The United States and its partners must redouble efforts to make clear that the South China Sea is an international waterway open to all. The new Maritime Security Initiative is a step in the right direction that should be continued and, over time, expanded. Washington and its partners should also promote greater transparency about Chinese maritime militias, which have been used as irregular military forces that operate in the gray zone. The United States should also help improve regional maritime domain awareness to facilitate navigation, safe transit, search and rescue, and natural disaster response. These steps would reinforce the essential premise that this huge maritime domain is a vital element of the global commons, not a national preserve.

2. Continue to increase U.S. military support and presence in the Philippines. Joint U.S.-Philippine military cooperation and exercises are now at levels not seen since the U.S. departure from Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the early 1990s. The two countries started conducted joint naval patrols in March, and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced in April that the United States would rotate troops and combat aircraft to the Philippines in the future. The next step could be a robust exercise program that demonstrates bilateral military strength. The U.S. Marines and their Philippine counterparts could practice landings on Palawan Island, an area that abuts China’s nine dash line. The U.S. Army could demonstrate its abilities to rapidly deploy from U.S. bases to establish missile defense sites and expeditionary logistics nodes on remote Philippine islands, while the U.S. Air Force could expand air defense exercises and base dispersal options with the Philippine air force. They could also continue improving base infrastructure that both countries could use during a conflict, including hardened aircraft shelters, upgraded dispersal airfields, protected munitions storage, and prepared air and missile defense locations.

A more controversial option would be for the United States to announce that its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines includes the disputed Scarborough Shoal — similar to its 2014 announcement that the disputed Senkaku islands fell within the defensive perimeter of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This would strengthen the U.S. commitment to defend its allies against Chinese encroachment, but might unintentionally promote more provocative behavior by the Philippines.

3. Strengthen the U.S. military relationship with Vietnam. Bilateral relations have warmed dramatically in recent years. President Obama lifted the longstanding U.S. arms embargo in May, and recent U.S. military port visits signal the beginning of a closer military relationship. The United States could seek expanded opportunities to exercise air and land capabilities with the Vietnamese, including the use of airbases and port facilities. The United States could also sell Vietnam fourth-generation F-16 or F/A-18 fighters, which would significantly improve its air defense capabilities and might prove a potent deterrent. These steps could improve long-term prospects for access, overflight, and perhaps even rotational basing of U.S. ships, aircraft, or other forces.

4. Sustain a significant U.S. and international Coast Guard presence in the South China Sea. Beijing has masterfully employed commercial and coast guard-like vessels to advance its claims and intimidate its regional neighbors in the South China Sea for years, which has helped it avoid the international military response that naval ships might provoke. The United States and its partners could counter these tactics by establishing a regular and visible coast guard presence. Only the United States has a major global coast guard capability, but some regional and even some international partners might be able to assist. As China has demonstrated, Coast Guard vessels are less provocative than warships, and their employment by the United States and partners could confront similar Chinese ships with far less risk of military escalation.

5. Increase U.S. military activity in the South China Sea. The United States periodically patrols the South China Sea with its Nimitz-class carriers, and less frequently, with its large-deck amphibious carriers. The United States could ensure that a carrier strike group or amphibious ready group with power projection capabilities (including marines) remained in the South China Sea for at least six out of every 12 months. The U.S. Air Force could conduct more frequent overflights in the region, including with B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers. The United States could also increase its surveillance activities over the Chinese-claimed islands, including by flying directly over them at high altitudes (which the United States considers international airspace). Washington could lower the risk of inadvertent military escalation by encouraging international participation and announcing these activities well in advance. This option would not only provide an important signal of U.S. intentions, but would also ensure that a substantial amount of U.S. immediate strike capabilities is available in the event of a conflict that could offset Chinese capabilities based on its artificial islands.

6. Build floating U.S. bases in the South China Sea. The United States could respond to Beijing’s artificial islands by building temporary afloat bases that would sustain a greater U.S. and international presence. It could position one or more Expeditionary Mobile Bases (ESBs, formerly called Afloat Staging Bases) in the South China Sea, which could act as small, mobile floating bases that can project power in a number of ways, including basing helicopters and special operations forces. The United States could also re-energize the development of the long-studied Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB). In the future, a series of JMOBs could serve as mobile forward sea bases (like multiple joined oil platforms) in the region, large enough to support large fixed wing air transports and stationing hundreds or even thousands of troops. The Chinese are assessing this capability as well, but have achieved much the same effect by their island-building program.

The great advantage of ESBs and JMOBs is that they can support a wide range of less provocative non-combat operations, such as maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, counter-piracy, and humanitarian relief. Crewing both platforms with a combination of Coast Guard and civilian sailors — potentially from other countries as well as from the United States — could reduce the risk that China would see this as a stark military escalation. It could provide a valuable dual-use capability for the United States, supporting important missions on a regular basis (including the Coast Guard patrols mentioned above), but also enabling the United States to rapidly improve its regional power projection capabilities in the event of a conflict.

None of these options is perfect; many involve significant risks and tradeoffs and could increase the chance of conflict. Yet continuing with current, ineffective options would also have serious consequences. Left unchecked, within five years Beijing will have a string of bases, airfields, and ports on artificial islands spanning the South China Sea from the coast of Vietnam to the Palawan islands in the Philippines. These outposts will unquestionably be able to serve as springboards for Chinese power projection across the entire region. The United States needs to make tough decisions about whether to accept Chinese actions as a fait accompli, or to counter these actions more strongly. These proposals provide a stating point for a deeper conversation between the United States and its friends and allies in the region about China’s increasing progress toward unimpeded control of the South China Sea.

### 1NC Korean Unification CP

#### The United States should:

-develop a National Security Council Committee focused on Korean Unification  
-expand its alliance with Seoul by creating initiatives focused on defense and the environment  
-further commit to the extended deterrent for Korea  
-create trilateral dialogue focused on post-unification security between the US, Korea, and Japan   
-declare that military presence North of the 38th parallel will cease post-unification

#### The counterplan is the only way to ensure peaceful unification, but requires US military presence

Terry 2015- Managing Director for Korea, Bower Group Asia   
Sue Mi, "Unified Korea and the Future of the US-South Korea Alliance," December, CFR Discussion Paper

First, the United States should begin preparing now for all likely North Korean unification scenarios. As has been publicly reported, the United States and South Korea already have joint military plans to deal with a North Korean collapse or war with North Korea, but they do not have similarly comprehensive joint plans, either military or civilian, for the unification of the two Koreas. Currently, there is no organization in the U.S. government to prepare and implement a strategy to address the various unification-related challenges. The United States needs to develop potential responses, figure out how to best time and sequence the responses, and plan how to accomplish them. The United States should also begin working with South Korea to augment joint military planning and design comprehensive and detailed political, diplomatic, economic, legal, and social strategies for unification. As a first step, the U.S. National Security Council(NSC) should form an interagency policy committee—a working group headed by a senior NSC director or the assistant secretary of state for East Asia—to take the lead on this issue. The interagency committee would function as the counterpart to South Korea’s Unification Preparation Council, which was launched in July 2014 to come up with a “unification charter” that details South Korea’s approach to unification. The United States cannot afford to wait for the collapse of the North. Second, the United States should continue to work with the South Korean government to upgrade, modernize, and broaden the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Although there is some anti-American sentiment in South Korea, it is much diminished from previous years; several polls show that the vast majority of Koreans favor the American alliance and want to preserve it for the future, even when a hypothetical unification scenario is posited.15 Since the Joint Vision Statement of 2009 and the Joint Declaration of 2013, which promised to strengthen and globalize future cooperation, the two sides have accelerated steps to transform the alliance, broadening it from the original purpose of deterring and defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and global partnership that includes political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural cooperation. The two sides should continue to expand the alliance’s agenda to include issues beyond the Korean peninsula, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, counter-narcotics, cybersecurity, space, missile defense, nuclear safety, climate change, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Presidents Park and Barack Obama made a good start in this direction during their meeting in Washington in October 2015, but far more needs to be done. For instance, U.S.-South Korea cooperation on space exploration would be an element of the alliance that extends beyond the military or even economic realm. The more the alliance expands beyond its original threat-based rationale to an alliance based on common values, such as democracy, human rights, and free markets, the more difficult it would be for a unified Korea to jettison the alliance. Third, Washington should commit in advance to preserve extended nuclear deterrence in unified Korea. This would solidify the symbol of the U.S. security commitment to Korea and avert a potentially destabilizing regional arms race that would initially involve Korea and Japan and would then draw in China, too, because China would be determined to maintain nuclear superiority over Japan. This would be easier to accomplish if the United States kept as many troops in Korea as it has today (28,500) or even increased their number. However, the actual size and composition of that force would depend largely on the way that unification came about, with the force being minimal if unification is entirely peaceful and much larger if unification is chaotic or even violent. Nevertheless, it could be possible to maintain the U.S. nuclear guarantee—albeit in a less effective form—even if Washington withdrew U.S. troops, whether due to isolationist sentiment at home, nationalist sentiment in Korea, or a deal struck between Korea and China to win Chinese support for unification. (In the latter case, the United States could decide that the cost of pulling troops out was acceptable if it hastened the end of the current North Korean regime by cutting off Chinese support.) China would be uncomfortable with an American nuclear guarantee, but it could come to appreciate the U.S. nuclear umbrella if it kept unified Korea from going nuclear, which could lead Japan, Korea’s regional rival, to go nuclear as well. China does not want more nuclear states in its periphery. The U.S.-South Korea alliance has enabled the South to disavow the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, and thus the alliance serves broader regional interests. After unification, credible extended deterrence would encourage a unified Korea to discard the North’s WMD program and renounce any future WMD development. Fourth, the United States should commit to aid Korea during the transitional phase of unification. Washington should be prepared to provide support for the political and economic reconstruction of unified Korea, an endeavor estimated to cost $2 trillion or more. That would be more costly than German unification and beyond the capacity of South Korea alone. If the United States, other Western powers, and Japan did not help with the process, unification could result in a crippled state or one dependent on Chinese largesse. Such concerns, along with a sheer humanitarian desire to help people who have suffered under the worst tyranny and deprivation in the world for decades, are worrisome enough to justify a greater U.S.role in Korean unification than the one the United States played in Germany. It is true that there is popular sentiment in the United States that, as Obama has often said, “Nation-building begins at home.”16Yet the United States has been generous in providing humanitarian relief abroad; in 2013, the U.S. government gave $4.7 billion for humanitarian emergencies, making it the largest donor in the world.17 Even more significant has been the United States’ foreign direct investment, which amounted to $4.92 trillion in 2014.18 U.S. companies could play an important role in rebuilding North Korea, which has valuable mineral deposits and other natural resources that will make significant investment a paying proposition. The U.S. government cannot, of course, direct private U.S. companies to invest in a unified Korea, but it can encourage them to do so and make efforts to facilitate their investments. American nongovernmental organizations also have an important role to play in alleviating suffering. The exact amount of American assistance required is unknowable because no one can predict with any certainty exactly how Korean unification will unfold and how much it will cost. The very opaqueness of North Korea (there are no reliable economic statistics for this Stalinist economy) makes it impossible to predict the price ofrebuilding. The sum total of annual U.S. aid and investment would not be enough to finance the monumental costs of unification and South Korea should bear the ultimate responsibility. However, Korea would need international aid and investment to help shoulder the burden—and the United States should be one source of such aid, along with Japan, China, the European Union, and others. Moreover, the United States possesses the only military force in the world with the experience and range of capabilities needed for nation-building on the scale that would be required—and nation-building would be required, even if unification takes place in a peaceful manner, as in Germany’s case. The United States would not, of course, take the leading role as it did in Iraq or Afghanistan; the South Korean military, augmented by soldiers from the former North Korean military, would be in charge. But the United States could provide valuable assistance and advice to South Korean forces—with whom the U.S. military is already closely integrated—during the initial stages of the unification process. A likely role for the U.S. military would involve the hunt for North Korean WMDs, which would be, at most, a limited mission performed largely by U.S. special operations forces working with South Korean troops and, possibly, international partners. (From the U.S. perspective, the most important factor in assuring that unification goes well is to ensure that all of North Korea’s WMDs are secured.) The United States should be careful to limit its troop presence north of the thirty-eighth parallel because a large presence could alarm China; the actual number would ideally be discussed with Beijing in advance, assuming that Beijing were open to such talks. By successfully helping to stabilize and rebuild the Korean Peninsula through humanitarian and military aid, and by encouraging private-sector investment, the United States would affirm its enduring bond with the Korean people and fulfill a security commitment to an important ally, all while building a reservoir of goodwill for the future. The more the United States does to aid the unification process, the more likely it is that a grateful Korea would maintain the U.S. alliance after unification. Fifth, the United States should form a trilateral contact group of relevant officials from Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to begin consultations on the framework of the post-unification security architecture. Koreans may be suspicious of foreign involvement in their internal affairs, but they also understand that they would need foreign aid to help bear the staggering cost of unification and that outside powers are unlikely to commit resources without a say in how they are used. Given the tensions that still pervade the Japan-South Korea relationship, Korea might be particularly reluctant to discuss unification with Japan, and Japan, for its part, may have some reservation regarding the potential emergence of a stronger, single Korean state, although the Japanese government would look favorably at an outcome that denuclearizes the Korean peninsula. Notwithstanding such reservations, the United States and its two Northeast Asian allies should begin candid discussions about their own visions of a post-unification security environment. Japan has legitimate interests in the future of the peninsula, and any alteration in the U.S. relationship with Korea would have an effect on U.S.-Japan relations. Moreover, trilateral consultations and coordination would be beneficial to South Korea, particularly during the initial phase of unification. After unification, Japan could make important nonmilitary contributions to Korea by providing logistical support and economic assistance. Japan could, for example, allow international stabilization forces to use its base network to transport soldiers and supplies to Korea; donate aid, particularly food and medicine; and even send civilian medical personnel, aid workers, and police officers to participate in the stability operation. Eventually Japan could also offer significant development assistance and aid that a unified Korea would certainly need. As part of the effort to initiate trilateral coordination, Washington should continue to focus highlevel attention on facilitating progress in the Japan-South Korea relationship, acting as an honest broker in tamping down tensions between these two U.S. allies. A good start would be to revive and implement an intelligence-sharing accord between Japan and South Korea (the General Security of Military Information Agreement) that was originally under negotiation in 2012 but was never signed because it became too controversial in South Korea. The Japan-South Korea relationship is currently among the most troubled relationships between mature liberal democracies because of lingering tensions over historical issues, such as the mistreatment of “comfort women” (sex slaves) and competing territorial claims over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. After unification, the bilateral relationship might deteriorate further amid resurgent nationalism and without a mutual concern regarding the North Korean threat. U.S. policymakers should therefore make it a priority to foster reconciliation between the two U.S. allies, akin to the importance the United States once placed on resolving disputes between its allies Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and other issues.

### 1NC PRC Afghanistan infrastructure CP

#### The People’s Republic of China should

#### Facilitate peace talks between pressure groups

#### Stop relying on Pakistan on the Sino-Afghan border

#### Invest in Afghanistan’s infrastructure development with the intent of gaining access to a land bridge

#### Assist Afghanistan in creating an indigenous manufacturing industry

#### CP solves case

Asey 15, Asey is an independent researcher and writer based in Kabul and has served as a senior adviser to the Afghan government.

(Tamim, “China: Afghanistan’s New Hope” Foreign Policy 4/8/15 [http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/08/china-afghanistans-new-hope/)//eb](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/08/china-afghanistans-new-hope/)/eb)

With the recent surge in direct diplomacy and high level visits between China and Afghanistan there is an emerging hope amongst Afghans that China can be counted on as an honest partner, broker, and good neighbor. An increased economic and security interest in China by former Afghan President [Hamid Karzai](http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130928/100030.shtml) during his last months in office and the current president, Ashraf Ghani, with his [first foreign trip](http://www.voanews.com/content/afghanistan-ghani-visits-china-in-first-official-trip/2499173.html) to Beijing are all indicators of a great rebalancing act by Kabul to reach out to China after decades of tepid relations. But this new hope of a partnership should go beyond diplomatic niceties and be based on a strong foundation of mutual interests. Afghanistan needs Chinese financial, economic, and technical resources and its political leverage at the international stage whereas Afghanistan is the missing link in China’s regional diplomacy and geopolitics. As a rising power, China cannot and should not tolerate an unstable Afghanistan in its neighborhood. A troubled and unstable neighborhood infested with extremists and regional proxy terrorist groups is probably the biggest impediment to China’s rise to a peaceful and responsible power. History is filled with examples, such as the Byzantine, Ottoman, and Khmer Empires, where rising powers eventually fell or disintegrated due to instability in their neighborhood. Both China and Afghanistan have suffered from imperial conquests and fell prey to various geopolitical games. These empires were mostly supported by outside powers, and today, while China has managed to throw off the influence of those powers and strengthened internally, Afghanistan is still fighting its battle for a united, prosperous, and peaceful Afghanistan. China has international diplomatic clout, influence in the region, and is an economic powerhouse, all of which can help to facilitate talks with and pressure groups and states to achieve regional stability. While China might have legitimate security and geostrategic concerns over engaging itself in such a controversial international and regional issue (and potentially a never-ending insurgency in Afghanistan), the costs of staying indifferent will be much higher. A neighborhood engulfed in terrorism, the drug trade, extremism, and proxy wars is the biggest threat to the national security and rise of China. On the other hand, China should stop relying on Pakistan when dealing with Sino-Afghan border issues, particularly when it comes to the [East Turkestan Islamic Movement](http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179). The time has come for China to end its passivity with Afghanistan, directly engage with the Afghan government, and help support build a strong, national government for Afghanistan to serve as a credible partner for China in its neighborhood. Afghanistan has natural and human resources as well as a prime geographic location that are ripe for Chinese picking. The [World Bank](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2012/07/02/afghanistan-resource-corridor-video) has termed Afghanistan as a country with huge potential to serve as a resource corridor between South and Central Asia. China — one of the biggest [consumers](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/02/13/how-chinas-hunt-for-raw-materials-is-changing-the-world/) of raw material and energy inputs — has some of the world’s biggest [construction](http://www.economist.com/news/business/21565244-chinese-firms-are-new-challengers-global-construction-business-great-wall-builders), [railway](http://www.railway-technology.com/features/featurethe-worlds-longest-railway-networks-4180878/), and road companies. They are efficient, experienced, and highly competent companies who have been building infrastructures across the globe — from China to [Africa](http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html) to [South Asia](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-31866442). Afghanistan, however, has one of the most [underdeveloped infrastructures](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/EXTSARREGTOPTRANSPORT/0,,contentMDK:20560890~menuPK:868765~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:579598,00.html) in the world, barely even tapping into its full resource potential. China should invest in Afghanistan’s infrastructure development to gain access to Afghanistan’s resources and create a land bridge, better connecting China to Central Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, Afghanistan is the backyard of the Persian Gulf, and given that the [majority of Chinese oil supply](http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/oil-02042013105305.html) passes through the Gulf, it is of vital national security interest for China to expand its economic and political influence in Afghanistan. With some much of China’s energy imports passing through Afghanistan’s sphere, the security of the Chinese energy supplies depends on the stability of Afghanistan. China has some of the best vocational training institutes and higher education institutions in the region. According to the recent [Times Education ranking](http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013-14/regional-ranking/region/asia), Chinese universities and institutes rank among the world’s 100 best universities and institutes. Meanwhile China has also over the years accumulated valuable assembly and manufacturing experience for the international market. China can assist Afghanistan in creating an indigenous manufacturing industry in the country. Afghanistan — a country where much of the population is still [illiterate](http://www.uis.unesco.org/literacy/Pages/literacy-data-release-2014.aspx) — can greatly benefit from Chinese education and manufacturing prowess. Chinese business interests and products have mainly been rerouted and exported to Afghanistan via Pakistan because Afghan roadways from China cannot accommodate the demands of the mountainous border between the two countries. The Afghan business communities have a keen interest for partner with Chinese firms and factories. Chinese state-owned companies such as the China National Petroleum Corporation International and China Metallurgical Group Corporation have invested in [Amu Darya oil river basin](http://www.bbc.com/news/business-16336453)and [Aynak copper mine](http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1453375/chinas-mcc-turns-back-us3b-mes-aynak-afghanistan-mine-deal) in Afghanistan, though the experience with the two projects has not been encouraging so far. The contractual obligations have either been not met or were asked to be renegotiated. Despite China’s issues in following through and delivery in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has much to learn from the Chinese economic model. Afghanistan needs to move away from an aid dependent economy move towards a trade and export oriented economy. China’s economic policies have a lot to offer in terms of models and examples. China has successfully used a state capitalism economic model mixed with special economic zones, assembly lines, and export oriented trade to become one of the world’s biggest economies. In the long run, the benefits of Chinese engagement and influence in building a stable and peaceful Afghanistan far outweigh the costs. China can exert its diplomatic status to bring parties to the negotiating table and use its powerful economy to support mutually beneficial infrastructure development programs in Afghanistan. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan can be both a reliable trading partner with China and bring needed stability to the region. Instability in a country breeds instability in the region, and China cannot afford such a liability. China will have to engage in Afghanistan for its own national and economic security.

### 1nc Japan CP

#### Japan should join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and engage China to develop sustainable investment standards in China’s financing institutions

#### Japan should join the AIIB – checks China rise and promotes higher performance standards

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The future of East Asian regional stability and prosperity also depends heavily on the rise of China and the response of the rest of the region. To this end, Japan and the United States would be wise to complement their security cooperation with more vigorous efforts to constructively engage with China in key areas, including cooperation on multilateral financial institutions, on regional trade agreements, and on energy and the environment. The basic approach for such cooperation must transcend labels like advanced industrial democracies and emerging market economies, and instead begin from mutual engagement on an equal basis. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank The AIIB presents a litmus test of how the region will react to the rise of China. Major democratic economies in Asia (such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea) and in the EU (including France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) have signed on as founding members. The two prominent absences are the United States and Japan. China’s establishment of the AIIB should not be a surprise to anyone given the vast demand for infrastructure finance, the domination of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) by the United States and Japan, and the decision by the US Congress to block voting reform that would have engaged China more meaningfully in the IMF. Japan should join the AIIB promptly for three reasons. First, by participating in its formative period, Japan will be better positioned to promote high performance standards on governance and transparency from within. Second, Japan’s participation is important in order to foster ADB-AIIB cooperation. China is the ADB’s second-largest cumulative borrower with a total of US$31.58 billion in loans since joining in 1986, including US$1.49 billion in 2014. China can self-finance its own infrastructure development, but continues to go through the ADB because of the accompanying expertise, quality control, and environmental standards it brings. ADB-AIIB cooperation would help to establish similar measures in the AIIB, thereby improving its ultimate impact. Third, the AIIB calls for a 25/75 percent split of funding between extra-regional and regional members. The addition of Japan, Asia’s second largest economy, would diversify the sources of Asian funding and mitigate the risk of Chinese dominance. While the United States may not be able to join in the near future, Japan’s inclusion in the AIIB can help raise the American comfort level with the institution as US-Japan consultations provide an indirect channel through which the United States can coordinate with the AIIB.

### 1nc – transparency cp

#### CP text: The United States federal government should:

#### -repeal the Space Situational Awareness Sharing Strategy of 2014

#### -substantially increase publically available Space Situational Awareness data pursuant to that of the aviation industry

#### CP solves—increases SSA innovation and accountability to aggressive actors in space.

**Weeden 15.** (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the long-term sustainable use of outer space. “Dancing in the dark redux: Recent Russian rendezvous and proximity operations in space,” Space Review. 10/5/2015. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/3)//CB

However, that does not mean there is nothing that can be done. There are still steps that can be taken to enhance transparency and confidence-building measures for RPO, and other space security and stability challenges as well. The most important step to take is to recognize the value of making more information on activities in orbit publicly available. The analysis presented in this article was possible only through the ability to access such public information. Without the public information, those outside of classified government circles would have no basis to determine what is going on, aside from the information provided by governments, and thus could not play a role in bringing political pressure to bear on irresponsible actors. Publicly accessible information also allows a much wider group of people to analyze it, increasing the chances that innovative techniques will be developed and important insights will be found.

Increasingly, open source analysis based on publicly accessible information is also having a significant impact on world affairs. An early pioneer in this field, the Satellite Sentinel Program, used data from commercial imagery satellites and other sources to document war crimes and deter mass atrocities in Sudan and South Sudan. Open source analysts have also provided public evidence about the shoot-down of Malaysian Airline Flight 17 over Ukraine, China’s island-building in the South China Sea, and Russia’s expanding military presence in Syria. In the space world, publicly-available data and open source analysis was able to debunk some of the wilder rumors about the on-orbit activities of the US X-37B spaceplane.

This call for more publicly accessible data does not mean all governments need to be completely transparent about their space activities. There will always be activities for which the national security concerns outweigh the benefits of transparency. However, at the moment, nearly all the on activities in space data is controlled by militaries, and much of it is hidden from public view. Perhaps a good model for a better balance between transparency and secrecy is the aviation world, where the vast majority of data on aircraft activities and flight are publicly available, and where militaries still find ways to operate clandestinely where necessary in specific places and situations.

There are also worrying signs that the US government may be reducing the amount of data on space activities it makes publicly available. Historically, the US government has been the primary source of public information on activities in space, a policy stance for which it should be commended. However, the Space Situational Awareness Sharing Strategy that was put in place by USSTRATCOM in 2014 indicates that might not be the case in the future. Since it was implemented, the United States has stopped providing data on the size of objects in its public satellite catalog, and now simply refers to objects as “small, medium, or large.” It has also placed more emphasis on only sharing specific data with specific end users, and only after those end users sign a legally binding agreement that places significant restrictions on what can be done with the data. While in the short-term this strategy might help keep US control of SSA data, over the long-term it is likely to incentivize the creation of alternative sources of data that ultimately lead to less US control. And it also hinders the introduction of new sources of data, and wider innovation in SSA techniques and capabilities.

### 1nc – shielding cp

#### Shielding satellites solves for space debris

Peterson 16 - Senior Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, joined Aerospace in 1997. He works on a variety of topics including space debris, collision analysis, meteor showers, and satellite disposal. He has a B.S. and an M.S. in aerospace engineering from San Diego State University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. (Glenn, “ADDRESSING THE DANGERS OF DEBRIS”, February 10, 2016, Aerospace, http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/web-exclusive/addressing-the-dangers-of-debris//dmeth)

Smaller debris objects (less than 1 centimeter) cannot be tracked and hence are unavoidable. Satellites will be hit by small particles during their lifetime. One way to mitigate this is to add shielding to protect a spacecraft from this small debris, but the sheer number of such small debris objects in orbit requires hard decisions in terms of tradeoffs: as the amount of debris grows, greater amounts of shielding will be required. Extra shielding takes extra mass, which lowers the amount of functioning payload mass that can be delivered to orbit. This extra mass and/or reduced functionality is referred to as satellite cost. When a small particle hits a spacecraft, the damage can range in severity from minor surface degradation to inhibiting or ending the mission by hitting a critical component. An object that penetrates a satellite wall may continue on into the spacecraft interior, possibly damaging internal components; further, the object will break up on penetration, creating more objects from that breakup and through creating fragments from the punctured satellite wall. In some instances, the particle does not even have to penetrate the wall; the impact can cause material on the back of the wall to come off and spread further. All of these secondary particles generated by an impact are called “spall” and can damage the interior of the spacecraft. One way to combat this small particle damage is to shield the spacecraft surface. The most simplistic shielding consists of thickening the spacecraft wall until debris objects can neither penetrate nor create spall. However, the better the single-wall shield is in terms of resisting impact energy, the greater its mass becomes. This greater shield mass means either increased launch costs or reduced payload mass. Another shield type is the so-called Whipple shield. There are a number of variations, but the basic design consists of using one or more thin layers of a substance like aluminum placed at a certain standoff distance from the main spacecraft wall. Multiple layers of material are often used, with the space between sometimes filled with materials like Kevlar, to provide protection of the spacecraft interior. The Whipple shield works by dissipating the energy of an impacting debris object into the layers; the object fragments, and the fragments spread over a larger area until they lose momentum and cannot penetrate further. While the required mass for Whipple shields is less than that for single-wall shields, the spacing between the layers results in an increase in overall spacecraft size, which has implications for the spacecraft’s launch fairing. Specific designs can be complex; for example, the International Space Station has more than 100 different Whipple shielding configurations for different parts of the vehicle.

#### AT: high cost

Peterson 16 - Senior Engineering Specialist, System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, joined Aerospace in 1997. He works on a variety of topics including space debris, collision analysis, meteor showers, and satellite disposal. He has a B.S. and an M.S. in aerospace engineering from San Diego State University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. (Glenn, “ADDRESSING THE DANGERS OF DEBRIS”, February 10, 2016, Aerospace, http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/web-exclusive/addressing-the-dangers-of-debris//dmeth)

The cost of shielding must be balanced against the benefit it delivers. The amount of shielding cannot be so great that the vehicle’s mission is impaired or its overall cost becomes prohibitive. In a study performed by the European Space Agency, the lower replacement cost and lower failure probability for a shielded versus an unshielded spacecraft resulted in an overall savings greater than the cost of the added shielding; total savings were approximately 1 percent of the original satellite cost. Thus there was a small but noticeable benefit to be had by shielding this sample spacecraft, but the benefit for each individual satellite design must be evaluated for that particular vehicle.

### 1nc low-level cooperation cp

#### The United States federal government should expand space science cooperation with the People’s Republic of China that includes joint research on space weather, scientific research, capacity building for disaster response, and global environmental monitoring, exempting such activities from the ban on NASA-CNSA cooperation. The United States federal government should not repeal the ban on NASA-CNSA cooperation. The United States federal government should substantially increase unilateral space exploration and human spaceflight capacities, specifically mining the moon for Helium-3.

#### Low-level cooperation solves the aff without triggering the space leadership DA

**Pace 11** [Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, “China’s Growing Space Capabilities: Implications for the United States,” Testimony Before the U.S.­China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 11, 2011, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.11.11Pace.pdf>]

Gaining a better understanding of China’s decision­making process and strategic intentions remains a central objective and problem for the United States. This applies to civil space cooperation as well as other areas of the relationship. To oversimplify, in the case of the Soviet Union, we knew their intentions as well as their capabilities. China is not the Soviet Union, thankfully, but we may know more about their capabilities than their intentions. It is also possible they may not know themselves, but it is hard to tell even that.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia, there was a compelling case for human space flight cooperation with Russia. The Russians had extensive experience with long­duration manned space station just as the United States was building its Space Station with multiple foreign partners. There was a desire to symbolize a new “post­Soviet” relationship with the United States. Finally, there was a desire to engage the Russian space community internationally in a constructive project as opposed to engaging in missile proliferation and other destabilizing activities.

Unfortunately, there are no compelling political or technical reasons to engage in human space flight cooperation with China. The Chinese have space capabilities but nothing unique that the United States needs.2 As the Chinese themselves said the NASA Administrator Bolden during his 2010 visit (to paraphrase): “we don’t need you and you don’t need us but we could do good things together.”

The question of cooperation with NASA may be moot for the moment due to Congressional language barring bilateral cooperation with China in the House 2011 continuing resolutions appropriations bill:

SEC. 1340. (a) None of the funds made available by this division may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese­owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this division.

Even if this language were not in place, I would not recommend engaging with China on human space flight cooperation. The technical and political challenges are just too great – as are the political risks of not meeting raised expectations. However, I do believe that scientific space cooperation with China could be mutually beneficial and reciprocal while improving our understanding of Chinese decision­making and intentions.

Space cooperation with China could start small with scientific projects that have minimal to no technology transfer concerns or potential for dual­use exploitation. As an example, European and Chinese cooperation in space plasma physics has been successful. Two Chinese “Double Star” spacecraft carrying European and Chinese experiments joined four ESA spacecraft in high orbits around the Earth. The combination of six spacecraft had produced new insights into the magnetosphere and the solar wind. A similar U.S. project might extend work in plasma physics and heliophysics on traditional basis of no exchange of funds and open sharing of the scientific data produced. For example, a primary source of solar storm warnings is an aging NASA satellite, the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), which is almost 15 years old. Solar storms and coronal mass ejections can cause damage to electrical power grids and telecommunication networks. While plans are in work to replace ACE, it would be beneficial to have more robust sources of warnings.

Cooperation need not involve creating new spacecraft but could involve ensuring compatibility and interoperability with existing spacecraft. China and the United States already participate in international voluntary standards bodies such as the Consultative Committee on Space Data Standards (CCSDS) that develops open standards that enable cross­support for telecommunications and space navigation. The United States has been engaged in discussions with China for some years on its COMPASS satellite navigation system to ensure compatibility and interoperability. While GPS and COMPASS are both dual­use systems, commercial competition and open markets are expected to foster sales for satellite navigation receivers that can use the civil or open signals from both systems. Joint ventures are another way to engage commercially with China and strengthen international use and acceptance of GPS while avoiding transfer of sensitive space technologies.3

Given the reliance of United States on space systems, it is unsurprising that it seeks to reduce and mitigate the creation of orbital debris. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test of course added greatly to the orbital debris population. This was a regrettable action for many reasons, among which was that fact that China had earlier participated constructively in technical discussions within the Science and Technology Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) that developed a consensus set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines. Nonetheless, the United States continues to seek Chinese cooperation on reducing the creation of orbital debris and routinely provides “conjunction warnings” to countries – including China – at risk from being struck by debris. If China is successful in maintaining astronauts in orbit for extended periods of time, they might have increased incentives to cooperation with ISS partners in reducing potential hazards to those astronauts.

#### Human spaceflight capabilities beyond the ISS are crucial to space assurance --- deters future conflict

**Pace 11** [Dr. Scott Pace, Director, Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, “China’s Growing Space Capabilities: Implications for the United States,” Testimony Before the U.S.­China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 11, 2011, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.11.11Pace.pdf>]

Chinese space capabilities could be of potential value in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. While the six­party talks (North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States, Japan and Russia) are currently suspended, future discussions will continue to deal with missile proliferation as well as denuclearization. If North Korea were to give up its longrange missile capabilities and suspend space launch activities, it is likely that North Korean leadership will require inducements or compensation of some sort. One such offset could be Chinese launch services for North Korea satellites as part of broader agreement that eliminated North Korean strategic missiles. While highly speculative, it is possible to imagine constructive outcomes if China chose to pursue them.

On balance, Chinese civil space capabilities can be expected to increase in the future. China will be able to undertake unilateral and international space projects of increasing complexity that will in turn increase commercial, military, and diplomatic opportunities at times and places of China’s choosing. Today, U.S. human space flight capabilities remain considerably ahead of China by all measures or experience, technology, industrial base, and partnerships. Unfortunately, the continuation of the current balance is uncertain. The United States has failed to develop an assured means for U.S. Government human access to space, the International Space Station is reliant on the Russian Soyuz and unproven commercial providers with a consequent risk of loss of the Station should there be a major accident on­orbit, and finally, the United States has failed to engage its existing international partners in a program of exploration beyond low Earth orbit. Plans for a human return to the Moon are on hold and no other human exploration missions are in work. All of these factors increase the odds that the United States will not be a global leader in human spaceflight after the end of the International Space Station sometime in the next ten years or so.

The most important implication for the United States from Chinese civil space capabilities is not that the Chinese will be in space, but that we may not be. The United States appears to have forgotten the strategic value of a national human space flight program regardless of the existence of successful private endeavors. This may not have a near term economic impact on the United States as a robust range of unmanned programs will continue. However, the lack of visible U.S. leadership in human space flight may have serious foreign policy and international security impacts. It is a long­standing truism that the rules of international relations in new domains are created by those who show up and not by those who stay home.

### 1NC Indian infrastructure in Afghanistan

#### CP text: The United States federal government should increase its diplomatic and/or economic engagement with India by cooperating on infrastructure investment in Afghanistan

#### CP solves (Also doesn’t cause Indo-Pak war)

Pyatt 11— Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs American Chamber of Commerce in India( Geoffrey, The Importance of U.S.-India Business and Economic Relations, US Department of State, 6/24/11, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/167158.htm)//ET

I. Why Does India Matter to the United States? I certainly don’t need to remind this audience that our business ties represent one of the most vibrant features of the U.S.-India partnership. In many ways, our business-to-business and people-to-people ties will increasingly come to define the U.S.-India relationship. I also don’t need to cite for this crowd the statistics showing how fast India’s economy is growing and how far this growth will take it. What I would like to share with you at the outset is the U.S. government perspective on India and why we view it, as President Obama has said, as “an indispensable partner for the 21st Century.” People often ask why a country like India is so important to our interests in a time where domestic issues – from unemployment to rising energy costs – tend to dominate the headlines. The answer is simple: India’s values, systems, and core strengths mirror our own. Our relationship with India is particularly notable, due to the intangible assets that power our strategic partnership: democratic values, entrepreneurial vigor, diverse societies, a strong and independent judiciary, and a passion for innovation. These are the key ingredients of a knowledge-driven economy and of the knowledge-based partnership that we share. As the largest democracy in the world, India has extraordinary “people power,” with a population that laudably pins great value to social issues and democratic ideals. A recently released report cites India as having over 3 million popularly-elected politicians across national, state, and local constituencies, with over one million of those officials being women. That amazing figure not only demonstrates the sheer size of India’s political system, but also shows the extent of power that the voting public wields in India. With its democratic values, recent efforts to fight graft, and the adoption five years ago of the Right to Information Act (RTI) – reportedly the most utilized law in the world – the so-called “India model” extends far beyond growth, innovation, and management gurus. It is a model for how a country will rise with, and not in spite of its citizens, in the 21st century. India is on track to have the largest population on the planet by 2030, and might have the largest economy by 2050. India’s rise is fueled by a young, optimistic, dynamic, educated population. In addition to our shared values, India’s market offers tremendous opportunity to U.S. exporters of goods and services. India has a market of 1.2 billion of the world’s consumers. These consumers have growing aspirations, and the disposable income to act on their aspirations. This is a powerful combination. The complementary strengths we share with India offer a great platform with which to leverage these unprecedented market opportunities. The potential for innovative solutions that can arise from partnering world-class American technology with Indian corporate local know-how is virtually limitless. These opportunities span across multiple sectors. Just as Norman Borlaug’s agriculture innovation and his collaboration with Indian scientist M.S. Swaminathan helped to spark the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970, the U.S. and India are again collaborating to transform food security in India as part of an “Evergreen Revolution.” Our experts are developing, testing, and replicating transformative agriculture technologies, our scientists are collaborating on monsoon forecasting, and our businesses are investing in food processing infrastructure to help India improve farm-to-market linkages. The boundless potential for e-commerce, telecommunications, social media, and endless other business ideas that will arise from enhanced connectivity is staggering. According to a recent Wall Street Journal article, the current internet penetration in India is in the range of only 80-100 million, less than 10 percent of the population. On infrastructure, too, the opportunities are enormous.. According to McKinsey Global Institute, 80 percent of the India of 2030 has yet to be built. U.S. companies want to provide the goods and services needed to upgrade and build India’s railroads, airports, power plants, and fiber optic cables. India will need to invest $143 billion in health care, $392 billion in transportation infrastructure, and $1.25 trillion in energy production by 2030 to support its rapidly expanding population. But how do we best penetrate this complex market? For one, the U.S. government – through Treasury’s U.S.-Economic and Financial Partnership with India is working to help develop financial instruments and public-private partnership models to mobilize the significant private capital that will be needed to build the India of tomorrow. India, as the President noted during his watershed trip to India in November, “is not simply emerging; India has emerged.” However, the U.S.-India story still contains untapped potential and unrealized gains. · In the private sector, businesses would like to be able to move faster. India is in the process of embarking upon a major period of infrastructure upgrades, which, once completed will lower the costs of doing business, including in crucial Indian growth areas like manufacturing. · In addition to infrastructure, India has energy security concerns. As a recent report by Standard Chartered has suggested, India faces commercial energy consumption growth to rise at least 6% a year for the next several decades. · As the Indian government itself acknowledges, growth presents its own challenges. Managing growth in a way that includes all segments of society is a top focus of the Indian government. I know your businesses, too, understand that truly sustainable economic growth is best achieved by cultivating a broad base of support for market-driven approaches. Indeed, I know many American businesses are spearheading innovative strategies that don’t just sell goods and services in a vacuum, but also help enable the local ecosystems within which they work. Why? Because you understand that activities like strengthening supply chains and training workers have multiple long-term payoffs. You know that enabling ecosystems will enhance the labor pool, build stronger suppliers, and create millions of new consumers! We are also working hard to address these concerns, partnering with the Indians on everything from clean energy to education. The challenges are real, but we confident that with more strategic cooperation will come great benefits. II. Regional Economic Integration for the Future The opportunities flowing from a stronger partnership exist not only in the U.S.-India corridor, but across the globe. I’d like to turn now to what has become the topic de jour amongst India watchers in Washington, which is how the United States can promote regional integration and expanded commercial ties between India and its neighbors. The world is moving from a transatlantic century to a transpacific century, in which future economic growth, development, and the promise of innovation will come to define the rise of Asia. The pace of economic integration in the Asia Pacific region over the last two decades was unprecedented and serves as an example for other regions. It should, and I believe it can, be replicated in South Asia as well. At the moment, South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. While accounting for nearly 23 percent of the world’s total population, the region’s share of global GDP is less than 3 percent. India-Pakistan In the United States’ engagement with the countries of South Asia, one of our overarching objectives is to facilitate new linkages and opportunities for ALL the nations in the region. Reinvigorating trade and commerce between India and Pakistan, for instance, can provide extensive benefits to both countries and the vibrant societies that seek to flourish within them. Increased economic openness across South Asia, including between India and Pakistan, will generate new economic opportunities for one of the world’s youngest and most vibrant populations. Just as the private sector did in ASEAN, trade associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) can play a significant role in improving trade relations between India and Pakistan. Recently, FICCI set up two “Made in Pakistan” business and product exhibits in India, which were well-received. FICCI now plans to organize similar “Made in India” exhibitions in Pakistan for which it is closely working with the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Clearly, there is pent up demand for trade between Indian and Pakistan, as demonstrated by the volume of trade that transits third countries to avoid restrictions or endures the cumbersome offloading and reloading that occurs at the land border. Some analysts estimate that trade between India and Pakistan could be ten times what it is currently if both Government’s work together to relax economic restrictions on cross-border trade. And to provide context, official bilateral trade between India and Pakistan reached $2.75 billion in 2009 from $215 million in 2001. Ladies and gentleman, those numbers will only grow as India’s consumer class balloons. This is clearly something Indians and Pakistanis want. As a Pew Research Center poll noted this week, although India and Pakistan publics are admittedly distrustful of each other, both sides strongly desire an improvement in relations. Their motivation stems from a desire for greater economic opportunity and prosperity, which will undoubtedly lead to peace, stability, and a better quality of life for both Indians and Pakistanis. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it best, when he said in 2007, "I earnestly hope that relations between our two countries become so friendly and we generate such an atmosphere of trust between each other that the two nations would be able to agree on a treaty of peace, security and friendship. I dream of a day, while retaining our respective identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived. That is how I want our grandchildren to live.” In fact, we see enormous potential in India’s critical role as part of a “New Silk Road,” concept based upon the revitalization of trade and transit linkages between the South, Central, and West Asia. Frankly, at the State Department, we feel like we’ve been ahead of the curve on this. In 2006, through reorganization we combined the separate South Asian and Central Asian bureaus to create SCA, or the Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs. This has enabled us think more broadly about the region as a whole, allowing us to streamline initiatives and ideas that would have been otherwise subject to stove-piping. We’re going to review the potential for further for infrastructure investment and related capacity necessary to enable Afghanistan’s future sustained economic growth. Our priority projects in fields like energy, road and rail infrastructure, and trade/border management will help infuse new economic life into this critical region. Intensified engagement is needed to solidify this regional approach. Our hope is to build Central Asia commercial connections for these projects, and to link Afghanistan to India and other South Asian markets. These projects, particularly in energy and transportation, could have multiplier effects on the regional economy and may be the future key drivers of GDP and employment. With India as an anchor, U.S. government and businesses alike can pursue greater stability and prosperity throughout South Asia and beyond. III. What’s Next? So, what’s next? We in government are absolutely committed to doing everything we can to open new opportunities for trade and investment. Government can’t create or run businesses, but we can act as a facilitator. We can help create the regulatory and incentive framework that promotes innovation and economic growth. We have a variety of mechanisms for doing so. Finance Minister Mukherjee will visit Washington at the end of June to continue the U.S.-India Economic and Financial Partnership talks with his counterpart Treasury Secretary Geithner. And Indian Commerce Minister Anand Sharma is here in Washington right now, to meet with U.S. Government officials and business leaders. There are also specific fora that are designed to address the technical ways that we can improve our trade cooperation. The High Technology Cooperation Group, which has enabled both governments to significantly reduce barriers to trade in sensitive, cutting-edge high technology, will meet in mid-July in New Delhi. Other ongoing forums include the U.S. Trade Representative’s Trade Policy Forum, which encompasses a number of sector-specific dialogues; and the Department of Commerce’s Commercial Dialogue, which facilitates an open dialogue about trade. We are also expanding our cooperation in science and technology. The establishment of a new $30 million Science and Technology Endowment Fund will fund promising research and development projects in India. Such initiatives enhance our knowledge-based partnership, and reinforce the need for pro-entrepreneur policies including strong intellectual property laws, robust links between industry and academia, and greater access to capital. Next month, the Secretary of State will travel to New Delhi for the second U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. The “SD” – as it is called by India watchers in Washington and Delhi alike – will provide an ideal opportunity to discuss with the Government of India how we can proceed with our many bilateral commercial and strategic aspirations. I’d like to close this morning by issuing all of you a challenge: You have a unique opportunity before you. Through your work and your continued engagement with both our governments, you can help shape and nurture the economic destiny of a nation, of a region, and one of the most consequential bilateral relationships that the United States enjoys. Together, let’s continue working to further leverage opportunities for partnership, trade and investment. Together, I am confident we can lift the U.S.-India global strategic partnership to reach its boundless potential. With that, I’d like to turn it over to my friend Kurt Amend. Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions later in the session.

#### Engaging with India is key

Kumar 5/10—CSSR Doctoral Fellow at the UGC Centre for Southern Asian Studies, Pondicherry University (Sumit, How Modi changed the India- US relationship, East Asia Forum, 5/10/16, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/) // ET

In the first two years of the Modi government, India and the United States have taken calibrated efforts at the highest political level to transform bilateral relations. It was in this context that the visit of United States Defense Secretary Ash Carter to India on 10–13 April assumed huge significance. His visit symbolised the deepening defence ties between the two countries, with the Modi government agreeing in principle to sign three ground-breaking agreements. US Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar greet each other during a joint news conference in New Delhi, India, 12 April 2016. (Photo: AAP). The current era of US–India relations began after the Clinton administration’s containment policies failed to isolate India following its 1998 nuclear tests. India emerged from these sanctions a resurgent country under the leadership of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The United States then adopted a policy of accommodation towards India, with the two countries transforming their estranged relations into a strategic partnership. When Modi came to power, he did not allow his personal differences with the United States to dictate bilateral ties. Instead, Modi decided to redirect efforts to sustain and deepen ties. This quickly became evident when Modi made a state visit to the United States in September 2014 on the invitation of President Obama. Subsequently, Obama became the first US president to be the chief guest at the Republic Day Parade in New Delhi in January 2015. Defence cooperation has been a pillar of the two countries’ burgeoning relationship. There is a growing sentiment among US security officials and experts that, given its economic slowdown as well as security crises in the Asia Pacific, the Middle East and other regions, it is not possible for the United States alone to ensure peace and security. It needs to engage rising powers like India. As the Modi government has accelerated the process of military modernisation, buoyed by increased foreign direct investment in the defence sector, Washington sees economic opportunities in deepening defence ties with New Delhi. The rise of China and its assertive posturing in the South China Sea is another reason for the United States to expand security and military relations with India. India is concerned by China’s position on disputed territories and by the growing nexus between Beijing and Islamabad. New Delhi feels that the presence of the United States in South Asia would help maintain the balance of power in its favour. The Modi government also knows it cannot aggressively pursue military modernisation without access to advanced US weaponry and technology. Modi’s ambitious ‘Make in India’ initiative would also not be successful without the active participation of the American defence industry, given its expertise in the field. Isolating Pakistan internationally for failing to adequately address terrorism also requires New Delhi to sustain security talks and military exercises with Washington. Unlike the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the Modi government has shown a desire to work with the United States in ensuring freedom of navigation and flight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea. This shift in India’s stance is critical as it reflects the government’s determination to take a firm stance on China. This understanding has been reinforced by the Modi government’s special attention to developing triangular and quadrilateral coalitions with the United States, Japan and Australia as a part of its regional security strategy. Both the United States and India have made significant progress on the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, an undertaking aimed at reducing the barriers to defence technology cooperation and trade. The countries are also holding talks on the supply of F-16 and F/A-18 fighter jets for the Indian Air Force. These defence deals would give a significant boost to the ‘Make in India’ program. The Modi government has also pursued three crucial bilateral agreements — the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMA), the Communication and Information Security Memorandum (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). The previous UPA government opposed these three agreements as they argued that they would undermine India’s strategic autonomy and its policy of nonalignment. But in light of emerging security threats, the Modi government has agreed in principle to all three. LEMA will allow both countries to access fuel and supplies from each other’s bases, making it easier to coordinate military activities. The agreement would help India in carrying out operations in the Indian Ocean and expanding its maritime reach in the Asia Pacific. CISMOA will enable the countries to share confidential intelligence in both peacetime and war using advanced encryption technology. BECA would provide India with topographical and aeronautical data as well as products aiding navigation and targeting. Some concerns have been raised about the possible downsides of signing these agreements. For instance, CISMOA would enable the United States to listen to highly confidential defence conversations within India. There are also fears that under LEMA the United States would pressure India into allotting portions of its land bases for exclusive military use. It is for these reasons that India has only agreed to sign these agreements in principle. The Modi government has asked the United States to modify the agreements so that India’s security and sovereignty are not compromised. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar has made it clear that LEMA does not mention the stationing of American troops on Indian soil. India’s apprehension implies that, while it seeks close defence ties with the United States, the Indian government does not want to unnecessarily draw itself into a tussle between the United States and China. With the introduction of the US–India Defence Technology and Partnership Act this March and an expected visit by Modi to Washington to address a joint session of the US Congress, the future of the bilateral relationship looks bright. One hopes that this kind of engagement will continue, forging the way for a stronger India–US relationship.

### 1nc reduce military assistance to Taiwan for debt writeoff

#### The United States federal government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan, in exchange for Chinese agreement to write off Chinese-held American debt.

#### **It solves the case, China has incentives to say yes, and it helps the economy**

Kane 11 Former International Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School (Paul, "To Save Our Economy, Ditch Taiwan," New York Times, 11/10/11, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/opinion/to-save-our-economy-ditch-taiwan.html?\_r=0)\\BPS

WITH a single bold act, President Obama could correct the country’s course, help assure his re-election, and preserve our children’s future.

He needs to redefine America’s mindset about national security away from the old defense mentality that American power derives predominantly from our military might, rather than from the strength, agility and competitiveness of our economy. He should make it clear that today American jobs and wealth matter more than military prowess.

As Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared last year, “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.”

There are dozens of initiatives President Obama could undertake to strengthen our economic security. Here is one: He should enter into closed-door negotiations with Chinese leaders to write off the $1.14 trillion of American debt currently held by China in exchange for a deal to end American military assistance and arms sales to Taiwan and terminate the current United States-Taiwan defense arrangement by 2015.

This would be a most precious prize to the cautious men in Beijing, one they would give dearly to achieve. After all, our relationship with Taiwan, as revised in 1979, is a vestige of the cold war.

Today, America has little strategic interest in Taiwan, which is gradually integrating with China economically by investing in and forming joint ventures with mainland Chinese firms. The island’s absorption into mainland China is inevitable.

But the status quo is dangerous; if Taiwanese nationalist politicians decided to declare independence or if Beijing’s hawks tired of waiting for integration and moved to take Taiwan by force, America could suddenly be drawn into a multitrillion-dollar war.

There will be “China hawks” who denounce any deal on Taiwan as American capitulation, but their fear of a Red China menacing Asia is anachronistic. Portraying the United States as a democratic Athens threatened by China’s autocratic Sparta makes for sensational imagery, but nothing could be further from reality.

The battle today is between competing balance sheets, and it is fought in board rooms; it is not a geopolitical struggle to militarily or ideologically “dominate” the Pacific.

In fact, China and the United States have interlocking economic interests. China’s greatest military asset is actually the United States Navy, which keeps the sea lanes safe for China’s resources and products to flow freely.

China would want a deal on Taiwan for several reasons. First, Taiwan is Beijing’s unspoken but hard-to-hide top priority for symbolic and strategic reasons; only access to water and energy mean more to Chinese leaders.

Second, a deal would open a clearer path for the gradual, orderly integration of Taiwan into China.

Third, it would undermine hard-line militarists who use the Taiwan issue to stoke nationalist flames, sideline pro-Western technocrats and extract larger military budgets. And finally, it would save China the considerable sums it has been spending on a vast military buildup.

Jeffrey Lewis, an East Asia expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, estimated that one-fourth to one-third of China’s defense spending goes to forces in the vicinity of Taiwan — at a cost of $30 billion to $50 billion a year. A deal for the resolution of Taiwan’s status could save China $500 billion in defense spending by 2020 and allow Beijing to break even by 2030, while reducing America’s debt and serving our broader economic interests.

The Chinese leadership would be startled — for a change — if the United States were to adopt such a savvy negotiating posture. Beyond reducing our debt, a Taiwan deal could pressure Beijing to end its political and economic support for pariah states like Iran, North Korea and Syria and to exert a moderating influence over an unstable Pakistan. It would be a game changer.

The deal would eliminate almost 10 percent of our national debt without raising taxes or cutting spending; it would redirect American foreign policy away from dated cold-war-era entanglements and toward our contemporary economic and strategic interests; and it would eliminate the risk of involvement in a costly war with China.

Critics will call this proposal impractical, even absurd. They will say it doesn’t have a prayer of passing Congress, and doesn’t acknowledge political realities. They might be right — today.

But by pursuing this agenda, Mr. Obama would change the calculus and political reality. And Congress should see a deal with China as an opportunity to make itself credible again.

Debt is not in itself bad, when managed, but today’s unsustainable debt will suffocate our economy, our democracy and our children’s futures.

By tackling the issue of Taiwan, Mr. Obama could address much of what ails him today, sending a message of bold foreign policy thinking and fiscal responsibility that would benefit every citizen and be understood by every voter.

### 1nc CP Reform Existing MDBs & Ratify TPP

#### The United States should:

#### Not oppose China’s organizational initiatives or try to block other countries from participating in them

#### Ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership

#### In coordination with Japan, expand the voting power of China and other emerging powers, without conditions, in regional and global financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and seek a new capital increase for the ADB.

#### CP boosts U.S. strategic influence globally and ensures the AIIB doesn’t eclipse existing international financial institutions and spur a new network of regional development banks

Morris, 15 --- senior fellow at the Center for Global Development and director of the Rethinking US Development Policy initiative (3/20/15, Scott, “No, the US Will Not Join the AIIB – But Here’s One Thing It Can Do,” [http://www.cgdev.org/blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-–-here’s-one-thing-it-can-do](http://www.cgdev.org/blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-–-here's-one-thing-it-can-do), article downloaded 6/6/15, JMP)

The backlash to the discordant US position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) this week was swift and seemingly universal. So much so that I can’t find any voices defending the US view to link to here. Fair enough. As I’ve already argued (here and here), the criticism is deserved.

But I part ways with one emerging narrative about how the US can get back on track. I don’t agree that the US should join the very institution that it has so strongly called on others to avoid. Even if the will were there from the Obama administration (and it is decidedly not), the path to membership would be nearly impossible. President Obama couldn’t sign the United States up for AIIB membership for the same reason he can’t offer US approval for the IMF reform package (something he does want). Namely, the US Congress. Capitol Hill would need to authorize and pay for US participation in the new institution. That will not happen. Earlier this week Treasury Secretary Jack Lew reiterated the Administration’s urging for IMF reform in Congressional testimony (play video from 19.17 – 23.38).

Yet a better and more feasible option is already at hand.

There’s a higher likelihood that the Obama administration could work with Congress on a set of measures to increase the attractiveness of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the eyes of the very countries that are now looking fondly toward the AIIB.

The US objective at this point will be to ensure that the AIIB does not grow quickly to eclipse the existing international financial institutions (IFIs), or that the AIIB does not otherwise become the launching point for an alternative network of regional development banks, all of them excluding the United States. The best way to do that is to realize more of the pent up ambition for the new institutions through the existing ones. That means one thing: money.

The United States, and particularly the US Congress, can’t expect to “lead” in institutions like the World Bank if it isn’t willing to pony up more resources. This means demonstrating a newfound ambition when it comes to more capital for the World Bank and the regional development banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Much of the US talk in these banks in recent years is around doing more with less, leveraging more, and relying more on private money. In the meantime, many of the World Bank’s leading shareholders (China, the UK, France, Germany) are now demonstrating that they are perfectly willing to put more of their public resources through multilateral channels.

The United States can demonstrate renewed leadership by channeling some of this ambition from other countries into the existing IFIs. Why not announce support for a doubling of World Bank capital? That may sound prohibitively expensive, but the budgetary implications are actually very modest, representing about one percent of the annual US foreign assistance budget.

Is that too costly an investment to shore up US strategic influence globally at a time when it appears to be in peril?

### 1nc Fragmentation Net Benefit

#### The counterplan is necessary to reverse fragmentation from China lead initiatives --- impact is diminished U.S. leadership and U.S. backed institutions and declining regional stability and global governance.

Frost, 14 --- Senior Advisor at the East-West Center’s Washington, D.C., office and a Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (December, Ellen L, “Rival Regionalisms and Regional Order: A Slow Crisis of Legitimacy,” <http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/free/021115/SR48.pdf>, article downloaded 6/5/16, JMP)

Conclusions: Restoring Legitimacy and Direction to Asia’s Regional Institutions

The world is not yet witnessing “the end of a stable Pacific,” to quote Robert Kaplan’s dramatic prediction.53 No matter how their structure is designed or how many economies they encompass, regional institutions that exclude the United States will not replace U.S. power as a key organizing force. No other government can bring such massive resources to the table.

The real problem is not U.S. weakness, but a slow crisis of legitimacy that diminishes the perceived value of both U.S. leadership and U.S.-backed institutions. The erosion of regional order in Asia threatens both the future stability of the region and global governance. Both China and the United States attach great value to regional stability, but they are on different paths.

The trend toward fragmentation and rival regionalisms calls for overcoming organizational “stovepipes” and launching serious strategic thinking and action on the part of the president and his White House aides, leading policymakers in executive branch departments and agencies, and congressional leaders. Unfortunately, top foreign policymakers in Washington are currently hobbled by budgetary constraints and congressional roadblocks and distracted by crises in the Middle East, Ukraine, and West Africa (Ebola). Except for China, Asia is on hold. In addition, domestic political action during much of 2015 and 2016 will be consumed by the November 2016 presidential election. Asian friends of the United States know that these swings in the United States’ reputation and leadership come and go. (Recall, for example, the hand-wringing accompanying Japan’s economic rise in the 1980s.) They are right, but steps should be taken now to stem the emerging fragmentation of regional and global order and put U.S. influence on sounder footing.

The Obama administration has made some important moves, and President Obama’s personal interest in Southeast Asia and willingness to travel there have helped re-establish the United States as an active and constructive player. But that is not enough. Stalled trade legislation, sluggish growth in most Western economies, China’s mixed behavior in the region, U.S. political dysfunction, and the difficulty of winding down U.S. military engagement in the Middle East call for U.S. action on several fronts.

Revive and Reform Global Institutions While Making Way for New Ones

There are legitimate reasons why rival regionalisms have emerged. It is both ridiculous and shameful that developing countries remain underrepresented in existing regional and global institutions such as the IMF and the ADB. The major powers governing such institutions should adopt institutional arrangements that rectify this imbalance and adopt voting reforms without conditions. The White House should make the case for reforming both the IMF and the ADB along these lines in broad strategic terms.

The resurgence of China’s political and economic influence in Asia is a fact of life. The United States should not automatically oppose China’s effort to create new organizations, particularly the AIIB. Nor should it try to persuade like-minded allies and partners to stay on the sidelines. They have their own concerns that are similar to Washington’s. Instead, U.S. officials should continue to ask questions about governance and adopt a wait-and-see approach. In the case of the AIIB, for instance, it is appropriate to question whether the AIIB will conduct high-quality project evaluation, practice open procurement, take into account environmental and social concerns, recruit staff on the basis of merit, submit to thorough auditing, adopt safeguards against corruption and fraud, and adhere to transparent policies and procedures.54

Act Like a Leader

Domestic political dysfunction inflicts a high cost on U.S. foreign policy and national security. The failure thus far to ratify UNCLOS strikes other countries as senseless and hypocritical, especially since the U.S. Navy claims to observe it. Likewise, inaction on IMF reform has contributed directly to the emergence of rival regionalisms. The absence of trade promotion authority damages not only the credibility of U.S. negotiators in the TPP negotiations but also U.S. leadership more generally. Top-level administration officials must appeal to a broader congressional audience by going beyond issue-specific, conventional arguments and instead making the case for ratification of UNCLOS and the TPP and passage of TPA on broad strategic grounds.

Executive branch officials, especially the president, must also do a better job of explaining what the rebalancing strategy means and why allocating more budgetary resources and nonmilitary personnel to the Asia-Pacific makes sense, even at a time when parts of the Middle East are again in flames. Asian leaders will only believe in the U.S. rebalancing strategy when they see it in action. But resources remain limited, and the policy toolbox is still heavily weighted toward military hardware and joint military exercises. American men and women in uniform vastly outnumber civilian officials. One goal of the rebalancing strategy is to reduce this huge gap and bolster the United States’ political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic presence. The administration must fight more actively and at a higher level to obtain congressional approval for the necessary resources—and resist calls to divert them to the Middle East. Only the president can decide on such trade-offs.

The United States may not be able or willing to fund major physical infrastructure projects comparable to those funded by China and, presumably, by the new AIIB, but it can do more to build up Asia’s soft infrastructure. One example is expanded English-language instruction, which would have a direct economic effect in poorer ASEAN countries. Although more people are learning Mandarin, English is still the language of not only international business but also science and technology. Further expansion of visiting fellowships for students and young professionals is another relatively low-cost way of restoring the United States’ image as a generous leader. Good will is a strategic asset.

Reinvigorate APEC’s Vision

The United States should take advantage of upcoming and future APEC summits to restore APEC’s role as an “incubator of big ideas.”55 Following former president Clinton’s example, the U.S. president and his or her top lieutenants should recommit the United States to an FTAAP and express appreciation for China’s support of this initiative. He or she should explain to American audiences why this goal makes sense and where the TPP fits in this vision. Corresponding measures to improve employment prospects at home should be a core part of this strategy.

U.S. officials should not appear to be blocking China’s effort to promote an FTAAP, because doing so feeds Chinese perceptions that the United States wants to contain China. They are correct, however, that near-term conclusion of the TPP should take priority. At the 2014 APEC heads-of-state meeting in Beijing, the United States warded off a “feasibility study” of the FTAAP, which would formally set the FTAAP in motion, and accepted the establishment of a “strategic study” as a face-saving concession to Beijing. Carrying out the study group’s mandate will be a low-profile, time-consuming job for trade experts. More months will pass as APEC member governments study the results and discuss them with affected interest groups. Top-level leaders will not be involved for at least several years.

Build on Shared Strategic Interests and Continue to Contribute to Public Goods

The postwar history of U.S.-led regional institutions underscores the importance of shared strategic purpose. During the Cold War, opposition to the spread of Communism was the glue holding U.S.-led regional institutions together; when top-priority strategies diverged, the organizations lost their unifying purpose.

In today’s Asia, all governments see constructive, mutually beneficial U.S.-China relations as a necessary foundation of stability and growth. But beyond those basics, strategic interests differ. U.S. leadership is most effective when Washington avoids dueling with China or imposing a grand strategy on the governments of the region and instead assigns equipment and personnel to noncontroversial, relatively nonpolitical areas such as health and maritime safety. Progress in these fields is as important to the United States as to Asia and should be pursued even if allies and partners engage in “free riding” (which most of them probably will).

Beijing gets credit from other governments for not telling them what they should do, but the flip side of that stance is that no one knows what China’s ultimate goals in the region are. What goes on in regional institutions, new or old, conforms to this pattern. There are strong reasons to believe that China seeks to establish itself as the dominant power in Asia while diminishing the role of the United States as an external balancer. But how and toward what end does it hope to achieve this outcome? How far will the United States go to accommodate a stronger China? The answers to these questions will have enormous bearing on the norms, composition, tasks, and future achievements of regional institutions.

### 1NC RIMPAC Invite CP

#### The United States federal government should formally invite the People’s Republic of China to participate in the 2016 RIMPAC

#### Solves U.S China relations

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To start with, although RIMPAC is a prestigious event that will certainly benefit China, the exercise is not ultimately something that China needs to participate in. After all, it is only a naval exercise with the overarching purpose of displaying symbolic unity in the spirit of multilateral naval cooperation. Thus, by excluding China from RIMPAC 2016, the U.S. cannot really hurt China in a meaningful way (not to mention China’s behavior in the South China Sea). If the U.S. is serious about “punishing” China, then it should focus on more tangible targets, like stopping some of the trading or investment relationships with China. Then again such sanctions are always a double-edged sword as they can hurt both parties. In that sense, all the “punishing” China mentality is understandable from an emotional perspective, but such talks are not consistent with rational decision-making. Of course, it is possible that whoever talks about “punishing” China might be principally targeting America’s domestic audience, especially as the 2016 presidential election looms on the horizon. Secondly, China’s participation in RIMPAC is a true win-win situation. Even though China’s participation in RIMPAC 2014 was a success for Beijing, it was also a success for the United States. It is reasonable for people to be skeptical about the real utility of such an event in building mutual trust between China and the U.S., but the truth is that building trust is always a long process and we must start with baby steps. RIMPAC, by all means, is one such small step. Arguably, military-to-military relations are the weakest point in an already tenuous U.S.-China relationship. It follows then that anything, no matter how small, that can improve this military-to-military relationship should be supported, not opposed. Excluding China from RIMPAC would only be counterproductive to U.S.-China relations, regardless of what the gains might be for the U.S. and its allies in Asia. Lastly, it is understandable that the United States is now frustrated with China’s increasingly seemingly assertive behavior in the South China Sea and China’s overall foreign policy in recent years. This U.S. frustration is the larger context within which we must analyze the RIMPAC 2016 invitation issue. The dilemma facing the U.S. is this: how can the U.S. maintain an effective relationship with China and continue to enjoy the benefits made possible by China’s rise without giving up its predominant position in Asia? According to some recent U.S. reports (here and here), China is determined to throw the U.S. out of Asia as it gets stronger and richer every day. This is a big myth, partly motivated by domestic interest groups in the United States. As I have argued elsewhere, China does not have the capability or intentions to push the U.S. out of Asia. It is indeed very puzzling why such a myth is so deeply rooted in the minds of many intelligent U.S. strategists. A recent paper by Chinese scholar Wang Dong also makes the same point: China is not trying to push the U.S. out of East Asia, period. Thus, a confident and secure United States should not worry about China’s participation in RIMPAC. It is not a reward for China in the first place, and it will not be a punishment for Beijing should no invitation be extended. It is merely a normal confidence and trust-building activity, made all the more necessary due to the already tenuous U.S.-China relationship. There is no need to hype the importance of RIMPAC; just let the two militaries do their jobs.

### 1nc – Taiwan do the plan

The Republic of China should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China, beginning with an offer to reduce purchases of United States arms sales in exchange for a reciprocal reduction in military deployments near Taiwan.

#### Taiwan’s decision to cease purchasing arms will create cross-strait peace and boost US-Sino relations

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History has shown that emerging great powers and established or declining great powers are likely to fight major wars in order to determine the balance of power in the international system. There is considerable fear that the U.S. and China are heading towards great power conflict. As Christopher Layne argues, there are “several important — and unsettling — parallels between the Anglo-Germany relationship during the run-up to 1914 and the unfolding Sino-American relationship.” The headline-grabbing dispute in the South China Sea offers an excellent example of one of the several flashpoints that could spark a larger conflict between the U.S. and China. But the probability of great power conflict between the U.S. and China can be reduced if the two states can find ways to better manage interactions in flashpoint areas.

The oldest flashpoint, and the area most important for Chinese domestic politics, is the Taiwan Strait. In 1972, the Shanghai Communique stated that the so-called Taiwan question was the most important issue blocking the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. This question has yet to be solved, mostly because Taiwan has been able to deter attack through a strong indigenous defense capability backed up by American commitment.

The status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be unsustainable as China continues to improve its military capabilities and adopt more aggressive military strategies. If the U.S. wants to avert a war with China in the Taiwan Strait, it must start looking for an alternative to the status quo. Taiwan’s strategy of economic accommodation with China under the Ma Ying-jeou administration has brought about benefits. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan to deepen its military and political accommodation with China. This would be a difficult pill for Taiwan to swallow, but it could offer the most sustainable deterrent to armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

For years, Taiwan’s de facto independence from China has relied on a qualitatively superior, defense-focused military that could prevent the landing of a large Chinese force on the island. The growing power of the Chinese military, especially its naval and missile forces, has begun eroding this qualitative advantage. Indeed, some observers have already concluded that “the days when [Taiwan] forces had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over [China] are over.” Taiwan still possesses a formidable military and could inflict high costs on an attacking Chinese force, but ultimately American intervention would likely be necessary to save Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack.

Military intervention by the U.S. on the behalf of Taiwan would be met with formidable Chinese resistance. China’s anti-access/area denial strategy complicates the U.S.’s ability to project power in the Taiwan Strait. China’s latest maritime strategy document, released in May of this year, states that China’s navy will start shifting its focus further offshore to include open seas protection missions. Such a shift implies an aspirational capability to keep intervening American forces away from Taiwan. American political leaders have not given up on Taiwan, and the 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy places a premium on reassuring allies of America’s commitments. However, the fact that China’s improving military capabilities will make an American military intervention on behalf of Taiwan more and more costly must not be ignored.

The best option for preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait is deepening the strategy of accommodation that Beijing and Taipei have already started. According to Baohui Zhang, accommodation “relies on expanding common interests, institutionalizing dialogues, promoting security confidence-building and offering assurances to establish mutual trust.” The Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan has tried to use accommodation as a way to lock in the status quo and avoid conflict, but their efforts have been met with more and more popular backlash in Taiwan. China’s military strategy document does acknowledge that “cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed.”

If Taiwan is serious about accommodation as a means of deterring military conflict, then it should cease purchasing military equipment from the U.S. Stopping the arms purchases would send a clear message to Beijing that Taiwan is interested in deeper accommodation. A halt in arms sales would also benefit U.S.-Chinese relations by removing a “major stumbling block for developing bilateral military-to-military ties.” This is certainly a very controversial proposal, and would likely be very difficult to sell to the Taiwanese people, but as I’ve already explained the status quo is becoming more and more untenable.

### 1nc Track Two CP

#### Counterplan Text: The United States federal government should support an increase in Track Two diplomacy [over the plan].

#### It competes – the plan uses official government diplomacy; Track 2 is unofficial and non-governmental

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The term “Track 2” now has a generally accepted meaning in the Asia-Pacific region – a meaning that is not necessarily completely synonymous with usage in other regions. Track 2 refers to unofficial activities, involving academics, think tank researchers, journalists, and former officials, as well as current officials participating in their private capacities. This is distinct from “Track 1”, which is defined as official, government led multilateral organizations and processes such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and multilateral defense cooperation programs. A defining characteristic of Track 2, however, is the existence of some linkage to Track 1, either through the participation of officials and/or institutionalized reporting arrangements, such as have been formed between the ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). The essential elements of second track diplomacy are evinced in the establishment of CSCAP, which has emerged as one of the leading Track 2 institutions in the Asia-Pacific region. Three themes permeated the discussions that attended its establishment. The first was that the Council should be a non-governmental institution but that it should involve government officials, albeit in their private capacities. Although it was considered essential that the institution be independent from official control in order to take full advantage of the extraordinary vitality and intellectual richness of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in the second track process, it was also recognized that official involvement was necessary in order to attract government resources and to ensure that the value and practicability of the NGO efforts secured official appreciation. In other words, the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second track process. It was considered important that the official involvement include senior military personnel as well as defense civilians and foreign affairs officers

#### Track two solves the case by building support for longer term policy implementation without triggering negative political reactions. Net benefits are politics and rising expectations.

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These examples illustrate that track two diplomacy, both in event and dialogue formats, can be conceptualized as a means of policy coordination, as well as a process of conflict resolution. Existing track two initiatives in Northeast Asia should be regarded by the United States as an important instrument for medium and long-term engagement within China and the Northeast Asian region. Washington should approach track two with the following functions in mind. First, by identifying and incorporating change agents and forming epistemic communities around significant issue areas, which entail establishing ‘‘network[s] of professionals with expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’’ As noted above, given the elite positioning of track two participants, the information and advice produced by these communities feeds into foreign policy decision making at higher levels. Second, track two should be embraced as a medium and longterm strategy to create incentives for ongoing cooperation in bilateral and multilateral frameworks by shaping state incentives over time. Track two settings enable the sharing of information and the generation of shared expectations under conditions of sustained interaction. Track two must seek to foster sustainable frameworks to monitor the behavior of regional actors and thus expose and penalize cheating. Finally, symbolic events, under the rubric of track two diplomacy, should be seen as a means to leverage regional counterparts by shaping public opinion and incrementally building public confidence.

Current Challenges and Opportunities for Leverage in the East Asian Context Regional Security

The United States has a substantial and ongoing interest in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and track two diplomacy has several applications over the medium and long term that can contribute to this sphere of U.S. interests. In the short term, Washington is committed, both by preserving the regional balance of power and through diplomatic frameworks, to ensuring that flashpoints on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait do not erupt into war. To this end, the United States maintains the forward-posturing of its conventional military forces and the nuclear umbrella under existing bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea (ROK) and its tradition of declared, if conditional, support for Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.

But in acknowledging the ongoing salience of existing strategic alignments and existing balance of power and hedging dynamics at the track one level, it is also in the U.S. interest to pursue peaceful relations with China over the medium-term. This entails shaping China’s strategic perceptions as an emerging regional power. Washington must find ways to discourage Beijing’s view that the United States regards a strong China as a ‘‘strategic competitor’’ and is seeking to contain it, and at the same time encouraging China to behave non-provocatively towards its neighbors. China will be the preeminent military power in Asia within 10 to 20 years if it sustains current spending on modernizing and diversifying its military.28 America should not necessarily fear a militarily strong China, provided that shared Sino-American strategic goals and expectations can be fostered. In working toward this ultimate objective, it is in U.S. interests to foster dialogues and CSBMs with Chinese officials and foreign policy experts to better understand Chinese strategic thinking

Improving confidence and establishing constructive, ongoing security dialogues on a second track with China could be especially beneficial in enabling Washington to address perhaps its most substantial security challenge in Northeast Asia: the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang’s October 9, 2006, nuclear test inadvertently highlighted Beijing and Washington’s shared interest in seeking to prevent additional provocations of this kind when, on the basis of U.S. intelligence, Beijing tried and failed to dissuade the DPRK from undertaking the test, and then publicly branded Pyongyang’s move as ‘‘brazen’’ after the event.30 Since this catalyzing moment, and with Washington continuing to regard China as a broker to Pyongyang, diplomatic avenues toward reaching a workable framework for disarmament on the Peninsula appear promising. In February, 2007, a ‘‘joint agreement’’ issued by the Six Party states affirmed the common goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and signaled the willingness of all parties to work toward the normalization of diplomatic relations where they do not exist. More recently, the August 2007 posting of American experts to oversee the dismantling of parts of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and the recent performance of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Pyongyang, attest to the Bush administration’s departure from an ‘‘axis of evil’’ hard-line stance toward embracing diplomacy as an instrument for moving forward with the DPRK. The incoming administration will thus inherit some promising and creative diplomatic apertures on the first, second and third tracks that should not be left languishing. One of the key decisions the next U.S. administration will have to make with respect to apertures is the selection of envoys to maintain progress in ongoing initiatives and not lose momentum during a time of transition for American leadership. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the hard-earned relationships formed between lead U.S. negotiator Ambassador Christopher Hill and the DPRK counterparts Lee Gun and Kim Gye Gwan are essential to alleviating any misgivings that have halted the dismantling of the Yongbyon reactor.

Track two events such as the orchestra visit should be encouraged, as they will help Washington ensure, in line with its short-term objectives in relation to the DPRK, that incremental gains in confidence can be transmitted from the semi-official to the official sphere, giving the 2007 joint agreement its greatest ultimate chance of success. Track two events could also serve asgestures of good faith by Washington that will encourage Beijing, which is often exasperated by Washington’s hard-line stance and maintains highly beneficial economic ties with the DPRK, to remain constructively engaged in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Many Northeast Asian analysts currently argue that the US’s ultimate long-term objective—peaceful regime change—will come about only via diplomatic engagement and not through the isolation of the Kim Jong Il regime. Chadwick I. Smith uses the metaphor of ‘‘strategic entanglement’’ to describe the kinds of cross-cutting ties and agreements that will be necessary in order to peacefully draw the Hermit Kingdom into the international community.31 Track two diplomacy has a substantial role to play in affecting ‘‘strategic entanglement.’’ Non-binding dialogues and events will be instrumental in fostering a political climate conducive to the opening of the DPRK, and for parlaying steps forward in one sphere of relations, such as disarmament, into discussions about advancing ties in others, such as economic investment or cultural relations. The authors of a recent Atlantic Council report on U.S.-DPRK relations note that the establishment of a multilateral regional security framework will also be vital to ensuring the DPRK’s peaceful entry into the regional and international community by providing an environment in which, among other things, the DPRK will be socialized into adopting the security norms of the international community.

To this end, our discussion now turns to the Northeast Asian strategic order at large, to assess the prospects for engaging China in substantive dialogue on the prospects for a multilateral regional security architecture with the U.S. and its regional allies with the goal of engaging the DPRK and other substantive benefits in mind.

Given the shared goal in moving forward on the DPRK issue, track two dialogues should open between the U.S. and China at the bilateral level as a basis for moving beyond the hedging dynamic currently at play in the bilateral relationship. Here the traditional ‘‘conflict management’’ functions of track two, focusing on confidence building and normative socialization if elites, are salient. Given the closeness of its existing bilateral security relationships, Washington can also act as a broker for confidence-building events and dialogues involving China and Japan/ROK, both also deeply worried about Chinese strategic intentions. The United States has a long tradition of shared military exercises with both Japan and the ROK, which have hitherto been instrumental in sustaining the alliances. While Chinese participation in these symbolic events is some time away, dialogue concerning the conditions under which military collaboration might take place should be initiated.

### 1NC UNCLOS CP

#### The United States federal government should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

#### The CP sends a clear signal of US compliance to international law while strengthening the pivot

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Tuan, "US 'rebalance to Asia' more important than ever," Jul 3, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/07/03/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-rebalance-asia-important-ever/#.V35juLgrLb1

The U.S. response to China’s call for a “new type of great-power relationship” has been mostly disjointed, uneven and, at times, confusing. There is a distinct disconnect in how Beijing and Washington perceive and understand the model. What the U.S. views as a way to manage competition (weaken instability) and promote cooperation (strengthen stability), China sees as a framework to acknowledge its new global status and respect of core strategic interests — one of which is territorial integrity and, by extension, maritime sovereignty claims. The U.S. will be in a stronger position in its relationship with China, as well as in its “rebalance to Asia,” if Washington can make the following adjustments: Expect and embrace friction. When two powers (one ruling and one rising) with competing regional strategies extend into one another’s security space, the geopolitical landscape will be ripe for instability. Hence, do not fear the friction — expect and embrace it. A case in point is Beijing’s insistence on a “new type of great power relationship” with Washington. If China persists, then give Beijing what it wants — but on American terms. For example, reframe the South China Sea as a strategic problem that directly involves the U.S. and obliges China to act accordingly. Explicitly conveying to Beijing that the South China Sea is a U.S. national interest and making it a “bilateral” U.S.-China issue may lead Beijing to question its strategy. Put simply, turn the table and make Beijing decide which is more important to its national interests — the South China Sea or its strategic relationship with Washington. Ratify TPP and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The most promising and potentially enduring components of the rebalance are the proposed TPP initiative and ratification of the UNCLOS. If passed, the former is a powerful economic integration tool to complement the other rebalancing instruments of multilateral diplomacy and military presence, while the latter weakens Beijing’s ability to call into question Washington’s sincerity to international norms. China is a member of UNCLOS but often violates its provisions, whereas the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS but has been its foremost champion on behalf of freedom of navigation, global commerce and international rule of law. Therefore, Washington should fast-track ratification of the TPP and UNCLOS while continuing to build up deterrent military presence and strengthen its principled network of alliances and partnerships. Strengthen alliances and partnerships. China most likely will remain the economic partner of choice for U.S. allies and partners in the region, while the U.S. will remain the security choice. As China-U.S. friction grows and intensifies, balancing these relationships will become increasingly difficult for U.S. allies and partners, and they will feel greater pressures to choose sides. Thus, Washington should aggressively pursue stronger regional security ties and be a dependable partner — in terms of policy constancy, resolve, and commitment — to strengthen extant alliances and partnerships as well as look for opportunities to build new ones. Seize the initiative, change the narrative. To compete with Beijing, Washington needs to reframe the narrative that China dominates with accusations of containment. Washington’s message is typically reactive and defensive, simply seeking to counter Beijing’s strategic messages. Therefore, the U.S. should be proactive, seize the messaging initiative, and transition to offense like it did during the recent Shangri La Dialogue. Secretary Ashton Carter hit the right note with his warning for China not to build a “Great Wall of self-isolation” and use of the catchall concept of “principled security network” to outline a vision that the U.S. has long sought to describe. This message needs to be reiterated at every opportunity. In short, acknowledge that both countries have competing visions, highlight the flawed thinking of Beijing’s approach and champion Washington’s approach as the better choice. Do not euphemize. Synchronize the message throughout the whole government and with allies and partners. There can be no U.S. policy seams or diplomatic space for China to exploit. Strategic opportunity At the end of the day, the rebalance offers a fleeting strategic opportunity to nudge China toward being a responsible global stakeholder and net provider of maritime security that contributes positively to the international system. Otherwise, inaction implies acknowledgment and consent to Beijing. Better to deter and dissuade Chinese assertiveness and unilateralism now than wait until later when it may have become a fait accompli. The stark strategic choice for Washington is to preserve its authority as a standard bearer of international law and norms — or be diminished as the pre-eminent power in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and ultimately as a global power.

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